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UNCOVERING WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY 
MARKET PRINCIPLES 
Michael Panfil and Rama Zakaria* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines, enunciates, and makes explicit a set of market principles 
historically relied upon by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate 
wholesale electricity markets as required under the Federal Power Act (FPA). These 
identified competitive market principles are supported by policy and legal foundations that 
run through a myriad of FERC orders and court decisions. This paper seeks to make that 
history and those implicit market principles explicit by distilling and organizing 
Commission Orders and court decisions. It concludes that five market principles, each with 
multiple subprinciples, can be identified as elemental to how FERC understands and 
implements its statutory authority. Clear articulation of these foundational principles 
should help guide engaged entities as wholesale power markets continue to evolve. 
Market Principle 1 states that wholesale market revenues should predominantly flow 
from well-designed energy and ancillary services markets. Market structures generally are 
found to be preferable to non-market structures. Moreover, energy and ancillary services 
markets, in relationship to wholesale capacity markets, are better able to efficiently 
promote a least-cost resource. 
Market Principle 2 states that when altering market design, FERC and Independent 
System Operators (ISOs) should focus on only those services that are clearly needed, and 
ensure that any market design change does not unduly discriminate between resources. 
Market design changes focused on technology-neutral and well-defined granular services 
will help ensure that the design change does not lead to undue discrimination or preference 
that effectively favors certain resources. When such an impact still occurs, strong evidence 
showing that the rules are not unreasonable and arbitrary and that no non-unduly 
discriminatory and preferential alternative exists must support the change. 
Market Principle 3 states that interventions that distort transparent and accurate 
pricing should be minimized. Out-of-market interventions, in particular, have the 
potential to distort price signals and undermine competition. 
Market Principle 4 states that FERC’s just and reasonable standard strongly favors 
rate decreasing outcomes. Markets are premised on the economic presumption that 
competition reduces prices, in furtherance of the just and reasonable standard. 
 
 * Michael Panfil is a Senior Attorney and Director of Federal Energy Policy at Environmen-
tal Defense Fund. Rama Zakaria is the Senior Manager, Regulatory Policy and Analysis at Environ-
mental Defense Fund. We would like to thank Ari Peskoe, Danny Cullenward, Rob Gramlich, Avi 
Zevin, Max Minzner, and Shelley Welton for their helpful insights and comments, and Ferit Ucar and 
Sarah Ladin for their thoughtful contributions. This paper is written by the authors in their individual 
capacity and not for or on behalf of Environmental Defense Fund. All conclusions and errors are the 
authors’ own. 
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Market Principle 5 states that FERC and ISOs should facilitate and not undermine 
state public policy preferences. FERC and ISOs are not well-situated to serve as decision-
makers in determining which state public policy preferences should be given effect. State 
public policy preferences that do not run afoul of FERC’s authority under the FPA should 
thus be given full effect.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) relies 
upon wholesale power markets run by Independent System Operators (ISOs)1 to 
effectuate its statutory responsibility to ensure “just and reasonable rates” in much 
of the United States.2 The efficacy and operation of those markets has been subject 
to recent scrutiny, with FERC approving significant changes to ISO New Eng-
land’s (ISO-NE) capacity market and tearing down PJM Interconnection’s (PJM) 
capacity market in the mid-Atlantic, finding it to be unjust and unreasonable.3 
Both FERC actions struck at the core of the ISO markets, and were justified on 
 
 1. ISOs were established to provide non-discriminatory access to the electric grid, and are re-
sponsible for system planning, dispatch, grid operation and monitoring. See FRANCISCO FLORES-
ESPINO ET AL., COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PRIMER 4 (2016). ISO members generally include transmission owners, generators, distributers, con-
sumer advocates, and end-use customers. See, e.g., Membership Organization, PJM LEARNING CENTER, 
https://learn.pjm.com/pjm-structure/member-org.aspx (last visited May 9, 2019); see also FLORES-
ESPINO, supra at 30-35 (describing make-up, governance, and operations of ISOs). These quasi-
governmental entities are also responsible for administering competitive wholesale markets, including 
the energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets. FLORES-ESPINO, supra at 3-4. 
 2. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). 
 3. See Gavin Bade, How FERC’s ‘Unprecedented’ PJM Order Could Unravel Capacity Markets, 
UTILITY DIVE (July 3, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-fercs-unprecedented-pjm-order-
could-unravel-capacity-markets/527053/. See also Calpine Corp., Dynegy Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180629212349-EL16-49-000.pdf; ISO New 
England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20180309230225-ER18-619-000.pdf. 
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the basis of foundational “first principles.” In the March 2018 Order centered on 
the ISO-NE capacity market, the Commission stated that it was “guided by the 
first principles of capacity markets,”4 namely that a capacity market should:  
 
facilitate robust competition for capacity supply obligations, provide price 
signals that guide the orderly entry and exit of capacity resources, result 
in the selection of the least-cost set of resources that possess the attributes 
sought by the markets, provide price transparency, shift risk as appropri-
ate from customers to private capital, and mitigate market power.5  
 
In sum, the Commission stated, “the purpose of basing capacity market constructs 
on these principles is to produce a level of investor confidence that is sufficient to 
ensure resource adequacy at just and reasonable rates.”6 
Just three months later a different set of foundational first principles was 
enunciated in an order finding PJM’s capacity market structure to be unjust and 
unreasonable. There, the Commission found that PJM’s structure had failed to 
meet the goal of protecting and increasing the “integrity” of the wholesale capacity 
market.7 Both the ISO-NE and PJM orders framed the discussion around the va-
lidity of market structure proposals to address perceived tension between competi-
tive wholesale capacity markets and state climate policies supporting generation 
resources providing environmental benefits.8 This framing appears to primarily be 
pretense; based upon the first principles identified, the Commission assessed the 
proposals with different goals in mind. In a dissenting opinion, Commissioner 
Glick summarized the inconsistent state of play simply: 
In the order approving ISO New England Inc.’s Capacity Auctions . . . 
proposal, the Commission set out a series of “first principles,” the pur-
pose of which the Commission stated was to ensure adequate “investor 
confidence” in the capacity market. Ensuring “investor confidence” ap-
peared, albeit briefly, to be the Commission’s new standard for evaluating 
how capacity markets should address state policies. However, just three 
months later, the Commission appears to have settled on a new standard, 
the “integrity” of the market, for justifying interference with state poli-
cies. Other than a passing reference . . . the phrase “investor confidence” 
is absent from the Commission’s discussion in today’s order.9 
 
 4. ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 21 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at PP 150, 162 (June 29, 2018). 
 8. ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 6 (Mar. 9, 2018); Calpine Corp., 163 
FERC ¶ 61,236, at PP 4, 21 (June 29, 2018). 
 9. Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at 6 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
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The Commission’s desire to identify and rely upon foundational first princi-
ples is consistent with the scope and magnitude of the ISO-NE and PJM Orders. 
The first principles identified appear novel and fluid, however, and appear to de-
part from long-standing Commission precedent and activity. 
No singular document exists that explicitly outlines, with specificity and un-
derlying rationale, FERC’s foundational first principles in regulating wholesale 
power markets. Rather, elemental preferences and foundational principles are 
spread across FERC Orders reaching decades into the past. This article seeks to 
make those implicit preferences, policies, and principles explicit by identifying, 
synthesizing, and examining prior Commission orders. In doing so, this article 
seeks to clarify the reasoning that the Commission itself has consistently relied up-
on throughout its history. 
To this end, this paper identifies five foundational principles that the Com-
mission has employed in decision-making. First, Market Principle 1 states that 
wholesale market revenues should predominantly flow from well-designed energy 
and ancillary services markets, rather than wholesale capacity markets, because 
market structures are preferable to non-market structures. Second, Market Princi-
ple 2 contends that when altering market design, FERC and Regional Transmis-
sion Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO) (hereinafter 
“ISO”) should focus on only those services that are clearly needed and ensure that 
any market design change does not unduly discriminate between resources. Third, 
Market Principle 3 holds that interventions that distort transparent and accurate 
pricing should be minimized. Fourth, Market Principle 4 states that FERC’s just 
and reasonable standard strongly favors rate decreasing outcomes. Finally, Market 
Principle 5 argues that FERC and ISOs should facilitate and not undermine state 
public policy preferences. 
Each principle identified and explored in this article is founded upon previ-
ously enunciated Commission policy, legal analysis, and economics. Although the 
Commission’s makeup itself may change from year to year, the rationale and logic 
undergirding its work has been remarkably durable and consistent since the intro-
duction of competitive wholesale markets. The following principles uncover this 
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I.  MARKET PRINCIPLE 1: WHOLESALE MARKET REVENUES SHOULD 
PREDOMINATELY FLOW FROM WELL-DESIGNED ENERGY AND 
ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKETS 
Wholesale market participants should principally rely upon revenues from 
well-designed energy and ancillary services markets,10 rather than capacity mar-
kets.11 This principle is based on three rationales. First, well-designed energy and 
ancillary services markets best effectuate FERC’s duty to ensure just and reasona-
ble rates, because these markets are best equipped to ensure the lowest cost tech-
nologies are dispatched first to meet demand. Second, wholesale energy markets 
direct compensation to delivered services, ensuring accurate price signaling. Final-
ly, FERC has historically preferred competitive, market-based tools, which are 
most closely embodied by energy and ancillary services markets, because such solu-
tions best effectuate FERC’s duty to ensure just and reasonable rates. 
A.  Well-Designed Energy and Ancillary Services Markets Best Effectuate  
FERC’s Duty to Ensure Just and Reasonable Rates 
FERC is bound by the Federal Power Act (FPA) to ensure just and reasona-
ble rates without undue discrimination or preferential treatment.12 In restructured 
markets,13 this mandate is effectuated through ISO-administered wholesale energy 
markets by “align[ing] revenue with the instantaneous supply and demand for elec-
tricity; generators and load change output and consumption in response to pric-
es.”14 Wholesale energy and co-optimized ancillary services markets are the most 
 
 10. ISOs run both day-ahead and real-time markets for buying and selling energy, and pricing 
involves a locational component to account for transmission congestion. FLORES-ESPINO, supra note 1, 
at 12. Ancillary services markets provide compensation for “non-energy products and services that con-
tribute to the safe and efficient operation of the grid.” Id. at 14. These are “services necessary to support 
the reliability of the transmission system” such as frequency regulation and black-start capabilities. Id. 
For more information on various services and products, see id. at 14-15; FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A 
HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 55-56 (2015). 
 11. A capacity market is not a market for “actual electricity.” Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. 
FERC, 860 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Rather capacity is “a commitment to produce electricity or 
forgo the consumption of electricity when required.” Id. The D.C. Circuit has described the sale of ca-
pacity as “a kind of option contract,” which allows a utility to “call on the capacity resource to produce 
[needed] electricity.” Id. The capacity markets in each ISO work somewhat differently, but many, in-
cluding PJM and ISO-NE, have an annual auction for capacity to be provided during a delivery year 
three years out. FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 61 (2015). 
 12. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012). 
 13. Many states restructured their electricity systems beginning in the 1990s to promote compe-
tition. During restructuring, states required utilities in their jurisdiction to divest their generation assets 
and, with encouragement from FERC, ISOs were formed with competitive wholesale markets. 
FLORES-ESPINO, supra note 1, at 9. 
 14. See Eric Gimon & Robbie Orvis, The State of Wholesale Power Markets; Principles for Manag-
ing an Evolving Power Mix, UTILITY DIVE (July 25, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-state-
of-wholesale-power-markets-principles-for-managing-an-evolving-p/447839/. 
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competitive mechanisms available. They offer a well-defined, interchangeable 
commodity, with prices set by intersecting supply and demand curves.15 These 
markets run without significant government intervention relative to capacity mar-
kets, and both supply and demand may enter and exit freely.16 They should natu-
rally and efficiently promote a least-cost resource mix, “allowing the lowest-cost 
technologies to generate electricity first,” because these markets can generally be 
operated with little regulatory or administrative intervention and are based upon 
resource owner bid decisions, which in turn incorporate their costs and expected 
profits.17 
Some ISOs also have organized capacity markets, created to “concentrat[e] 
revenue recovery in the administrative, years-forward standard capacity product, 
rather than in the more granular energy and ancillary services markets and volun-
tary long-term contracts.”18 Capacity markets arose out of concern from some that 
revenue insufficiency “due to price volatility, caps on market prices, and other reg-
ulatory limits to market operation,” might prompt “early power plant closures and 
discourage investments in new generation capacity,” such that capacity supply 
might not be able to keep up with demand.19 To resolve this “missing money” con-
cern, “capacity payments aim to supplement generators’ energy and ancillary ser-
vices revenue streams and provide investors with more predictability.”20 Whether 
 
 15. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER 35-59 (2015), https://www.ferc.gov/
market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf. 
 16. See, e.g., id. 
 17. Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
 18. JAMES F. WILSON, “MISSING MONEY” REVISITED: EVOLUTION OF PJM’S RPM 
CAPACITY CONSTRUCT 1 (2016), https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/markets-rpm_
missing_money_revisited_wilson.pdf. 
 19. FLORES-ESPINO, supra note 1, at 16 (citations omitted). This is the “missing money prob-
lem:” 
[E]nergy prices in competitive wholesale electricity markets do not adequately reflect the 
value of investment in generation needed to create a reliable electric supply. Because elec-
tricity cannot be stored at a large scale, and electricity demand fluctuates significantly dur-
ing the day and the year, sufficient capacity must be built to balance supply and demand re-
liably under any foreseeable demand conditions, in particular under maximum peak demand 
conditions (called ‘‘super-peak’’ demand). However, super-peak demand, by definition, oc-
curs during only a small number of hours per year (e.g., 10 hours per year). It is only during 
those super-peak hours that the capacity is almost fully utilized. The fact that enough gener-
ation capacity must exist to meet the high demand during these times means that much of 
the generation capacity sits idle during the rest of the year. To be profitable enough to stay 
in the market, these generators must earn enough money on energy sales in the super-peak 
hours when they manage to clear the auction to cover both operations and maintenance 
costs, as well as their construction costs. 
SYLWIA BIALEK & BURCIN UNEL, CAPACITY MARKETS AND EXTERNALITIES: AVOIDING 
UNNECESSARY AND PROBLEMATIC REFORMS 4 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/
Capacity_Markets_and_Externalities_Report.pdf. 
 20. FLORES-ESPINO, supra note 1, at 16 (citations omitted). 
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capacity markets actually provide this benefit is subject to debate, as is whether the 
cure is worse than the disease.21 
Problematically, capacity itself is an administratively defined good, and capac-
ity markets thus necessarily require administrative intervention to define product 
offerings.22 Capacity markets, unlike wholesale energy and ancillary services mar-
kets, involve explicit government price setting, such as the Minimum Offer Price 
Rule (MOPR).23 Supply and demand likewise do not enter and exit freely; both 
are subject to participation requirements.24 Capacity markets rely on a litany of 
assumptions, estimates, and subjective decisions by the market operator and regu-
lator, and where these assumptions or decisions are inaccurate, inefficient results 
will necessarily follow.25 Wholesale capacity markets are thus necessarily less com-
 
 21. See WILSON, supra note 18, at 4 (providing a critique of the Reliability Pricing Model as 
“ill-suited to guide changes in the resource mix going forward” and summarizing the shortcomings of 
capacity markets as formulated, including low prices, unpredictability, short time commitments, and 
excessive administrative costs); Michael Hogan, Follow the Missing Money: Ensuring Reliability at Least 
Cost to Consumers in the Transition To a Low-Carbon Power System, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 2017, at 55, 
55 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2016.12.006 (arguing that capacity markets are not solving the missing 
money problem, but instead creating a new problem: misallocated money); Delia D. Patterson & Har-
vey Reiter, Chasing the Uncatchable, FORTNIGHTLY MAG., June 2016, https://www.fortnightly.com/
fortnightly/2016/06/chasing-uncatchable?authkey=3d2731c2dc2856f13f36b01521a2e4ffaffbef294f4b55f4
c8b35ef078595c92. 
 22. See James F. Wilson, Forward Capacity Market CONEfusion, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2010, at 
25, 26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2010.09.013. “Centralized capacity market mechanisms involve 
many complex rules, combining market-like and administrative elements.” Id. Two such fundamental 
administrative elements are “the choice of the duration of the capacity commitments determined 
through the mechanism[s] ([i.e., the] ‘commitment period’) and how far in advance to impose mandato-
ry capacity obligations and hold the capacity auctions ([i.e., the] ‘forward period’).” Id. 
 23. The MOPR is a mechanism intended to “mitigate the exercise of buyer-side market power.” 
ISO New England, Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,138, at P 10 (2017). It is used where a “seller may have the 
incentive and ability to depress prices below the competitive level” and requires the bidder to increase 
its bid to “more appropriately reflect the Cost of New Entry.” PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC 
¶ 61,318, at P 135 (2007). For example, ISO-NE’s MOPR “requires new capacity resources to offer 
their capacity at prices that are at or above a price floor (the resources’ net cost of new entry, or Net 
CONE).” ISO New England, Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,138, at P 2 (2017). For a fuller discussion on the 
evolution of the way FERC understands MOPRs, see id. (Bay, Comm’r, concurring). 
 24. PJM and ISO-NE have mandatory capacity markets, which means that supply must be en-
tered in the market in order to receive a capacity payment or count toward an LSE’s capacity obliga-
tion, and only capacity that clears the market can count toward an LSE’s capacity requirement. See, e.g., 
N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 744 F.3d 74, 83-84 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining the 
structure of PJM’s capacity market). 
 25. See, e.g., James F. Wilson, Comment Letter on Notice Inviting Post-Technical Conference 
Comments (June 22, 2017), at 6 [hereinafter Wilson Comments] (“MOPR-style mitigation results in a 
mitigated, administrative price, it does not recreate a ‘competitive’ price. Such mitigated prices are like-
ly to be too high, especially since MOPR rules are generally based on administrative Net CONE esti-
mates that are far too high as indicated by recent capacity auction clearing prices that reflect competi-
tive entry but are well below the administrative Net CONE values. Accordingly, MOPR-based prices 
will generally fail to signal the true state of supply and demand, exacerbating excess capacity and de-
pressing energy and ancillary services prices.”). 
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petitive and less able to effectuate FERC’s statutory mandate of ensuring just and 
reasonable rates than wholesale energy and ancillary services markets. 
As such, if revenue shifts from energy to capacity markets (i.e., capacity mar-
ket revenues increase; energy market revenues decrease), the wholesale market sys-
tem risks subjecting proportionally more investment to normative decisions and 
regulatory determinations.26 Those decisions and determinations, in aggregate, are 
unlikely to closely mimic more economically efficient outcomes ensured by a less 
regulated wholesale energy market. Any imperfect capacity design choice, no mat-
ter how minimal, thus risks unneeded consumer cost increases by keeping uneco-
nomic and unneeded resources from otherwise leaving the market.27 All else equal, 
market based solutions should thus be given preference over non-market solutions 
to better effectuate FERC’s mandate under the FPA. Although capacity markets 
are favored over wholly out-of-market constructs (such as Reliability Must Run 
(RMR) contracts),28 a capacity market is more of an administrative construct (and 
therefore less market based) than an energy or ancillary service market, and there-
fore should be less favored. Exogenously shifting revenue from energy to capacity 
markets necessarily undermines efficient market entry and exit signals. Expert 
James Wilson further explains this concept: 
In contrast to the highly granular pricing in energy and ancillary services 
markets, RTO capacity constructs price a standard capacity product 
through administrative auctions creating a revenue stream based on vari-
ous administrative parameters and subject to various administrative pen-
alties. These constructs cannot effectively contribute to the accurate for-
ward valuation of attributes. Chronic excess capacity is also a problem, as 
it suppresses prices in the short-term markets, preventing them from ac-
curately valuing new resources and resource attributes, and also providing 
weak incentives for price-responsive demand and demand response.29 
 
 26. The fact that a market change follows this market principle and shifts revenue from capacity 
to energy markets, by itself, is not sufficient to evaluating the proposed change. The market principles 
within this paper should be read in concert, rather than isolation, from one another. 
 27. See PAUL HIBBARD, SUSAN TIERNEY & KATHERINE FRANKLIN, ELECTRICITY MARKETS, 
RELIABILITY AND THE EVOLVING U.S. POWER SYSTEM 63 (2017), https://www.analysisgroup.com/
globalassets/content/insights/publishing/ag_markets_reliability_final_june_2017.pdf (“The retirement 
of aging resources is a natural element of efficient and competitive market forces, and where markets 
are performing well, these retirements mainly represent the efficient exit of uncompetitive assets, and 
will lead to lower electricity prices for consumers over time.”). 
 28. “RMR Agreements provide the rates, terms, and conditions by which . . . power plant own-
ers [provide RMR service]. An RMR unit is generally a generator that a transmission provider can call 
upon when necessary to provide energy and ancillary services essential to the reliability of the transmis-
sion network. That is, some generating units ‘must run’ at certain times to protect the transmission sys-
tem from voltage collapse, instability, and thermal overload.” Gilroy Energy Ctr., 161 FERC ¶ 61,311, 
at P 1 n.3 (2017). 
 29. Wilson Comments, supra note 25, at 2. 
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Therefore, market design changes that shift revenue from energy and ancillary ser-
vices markets to capacity markets should be minimized (Subprinciple 1A). Indeed, where 
excess capacity beyond target reserve margins30 becomes a recurring problem, it 
could lead to unjust and unreasonable rates and additional ratepayer costs. The 
concern is exacerbated when market interventions additionally violate Market 
Principle 2 and/or Market Principle 3.31 
Recurring market interventions that shift revenues from the energy market to 
the capacity market result in power suppliers earning less money in the energy 
market and relying more heavily on capacity markets to account for lost revenue.32 
This can lead to a vicious cycle of capacity market interventions constantly striving 
to increase revenues in that market to recoup lost energy market revenue caused by 
the previous intervention. Thus, when capacity is over-procured, leading to lower 
capacity and energy market prices, the first response should not be to create new 
market rules to increase capacity market revenues for resource owners.33 Participa-
tion in wholesale markets, like any markets, comes with implicit risk and reward. 
Oversupply, be it caused by low input costs, stagnant demand, or other factors, is 
in itself not a concern; lower than expected wholesale prices are instead, without 
more, market signaling that a new supply/demand equilibrium is economically effi-
cient.34 The recent PJM Independent Market Monitor’s 2017 State of the Market 
Report appears to confirm this shift. Capacity charges continue to grow, and ener-
 
 30. The reserve margin is the “percentage of installed capacity exceeding the expected peak de-
mand during a specified period.” FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, Guide to Market Oversight: Glossary, 
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp (last updated Mar. 15, 2016). A target re-
serve margin is a targeted amount of acquired capacity beyond expected peak demand, and which is set 
by a reliability entity based on the amount of power that needs to be procured for the system in addi-
tion to that needed for peak demand. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Reg. 
Comm’n, 783 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining the Installed Reserve Margin for NYISO). 
 31. See infra, Sections II & III. 
 32. See Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14, at 6-7 (“[P]ast experience suggests that rather than retire 
during times of low revenue, these least-needed resources push for further capacity market tweaks to 
increase revenue, leading to a vicious cycle of market ‘fixes,’ which drive revenue out of the energy 
markets and encourage oversupply.”). 
 33. See Wilson Comments, supra note 25, at 7 (“I recommend that the Commission express a 
longer-term goal of seeing more revenues from the energy and ancillary services markets, and eventual-
ly phasing out the capacity constructs, or converting them to voluntary mechanisms, recognizing the 
changing nature of ‘resource adequacy.’ The energy and ancillary services markets hold the potential to 
efficiently guide the changing resource mix over time, including incorporating public policy objectives 
such as decarbonization that presently are not reflected in the markets; the capacity constructs cannot 
do this. Reducing the role of the capacity constructs will require resisting the frequent pressures to 
change them in ways that raise capacity prices and/or lead to clearing substantial excess capacity.”). 
 34. See Fabien A. Roques, David M. Newberry & William J. Nuttall, Investment Incentives and 
Electricity Market Design: The British Experience, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 93, 96 (2005) (“[E]xcess gen-
eration capacity will eliminate scarcity rents driving prices to marginal cost. When this occurs, genera-
tors on the margin will not be able to cover their investment cost. Unless such generators receive extra 
revenues through some form of capacity payments this will result in early retirement or mothballing of 
plants which will reduce capacity and drive prices back to their long-run equilibrium level.”). 
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gy charges continue to shrink year after year as a percentage of the total price per 
MWh, with capacity currently making up 21% and energy currently making up 
58% of the total price per MWh.35 
FERC and ISOs should strive for non-discriminatory market access to any re-
source. Diversity of resources may not be the most optimal market result, but mar-
ket access for a diversity of resources enables the most optimal market result.36 A 
shift in revenues from energy markets to capacity markets can undermine efforts to 
this end, insofar as capacity markets necessarily require some level of subjective 
decision-making that can stymie commensurate market access for all resources. 
FERC and ISOs should thus carefully consider how any market intervention could 
affect the shift of revenues between energy and capacity markets. If this careful 
consideration suggests that a market intervention could result in energy market 
revenues shifting to the capacity market, FERC and ISOs should conduct a rigor-
ous need and alternatives analysis.37 FERC and ISOs must then weigh expected 
benefits against expected costs, including but not limited to the cost to ratepayers 
from transferring revenue out of the energy market and the likelihood that the in-
tervention will necessitate future and further interventions due to decreased energy 
market revenues.38 
 
 35. MONITORING ANALYTICS, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM 20  
(2018), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2017/2017-som-pjm-
volume1.pdf. 
 36. “Long-term energy market stability concerns should be addressed by broadening access to 
new technologies and business models . . . .” Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14, at 4. 
 37. See William W. Hogan, Comment Letter on FERC Technical Conference (Aug. 25, 2011), 
at 2, https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_Statement_2011-08-25.pdf [hereinafter Hogan 
Statement] (“From the early days of recognition of [the ‘missing money’] problem, there has been a 
focus on using capacity markets to compensate for the implementation and structural problems. This 
process continues as the [RTOs] and the [FERC] review and rethink the structure of capacity markets. 
While such review and reform of capacity markets is a good thing, it has long been my concern that the 
process has proceeded with too much weight placed on perfecting capacity markets and too little atten-
tion given to improving the implementation of electricity market design in order to reduce or eliminate 
the problem of the missing money.”). 
 38. In discussing the changing nature of reliability, Sam Newell argues that “it is better to get 
the prices right — reflecting real-time conditions and telling the market what you need, when you need 
it — rather than just having a narrow administrative idea of reliability . . . [s]o [I] would like to see 
more money moving into the energy and ancillary services markets and out of the capacity markets.” 
Rich Heidorn Jr., Lawyers Take an Economics Class: Capacity Markets vs. Scarcity Pricing, RTO INSIDER 
(June 13, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/capacity-markets-vs-scarcity-pricing-27702/ (reporting on 
energy Bar Association panel discussion). James Wilson argues that not only should energy markets be 
the dominant revenue stream in a market, but that FERC and the ISOs implementing market interven-
tions should be mindful that “it has always been recognized that the centralized capacity market is a 
transitional mechanism whose role should diminish as wholesale markets further develop and the de-
mand side becomes more actively involved.” See Wilson, supra note 22, at 35. 
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B.  Wholesale Energy Markets Direct Compensation to Delivered Services 
Unlike capacity markets, energy markets compensate for delivered services 
and products that provide value to consumers.39 Capacity markets lack an incentive 
for actual delivery, and while recent efforts to peg capacity payments to resource 
performance in the Mid-Atlantic and New England capacity markets attempt to 
correct this missing incentive, they do so inefficiently, especially as compared to 
energy markets.40 Indeed, energy-only markets remain the “economic gold-
standard for performance and investment-quality incentives.”41 Price signals in en-
ergy markets provide incentives to consumers and suppliers of energy services to 
make economically efficient consumption and generation decisions and to invest in 
new resources where and when they are most needed. On the other hand, in capac-
ity market constructs price signals are distorted by administrative intervention and 
necessarily subjective determinations. Yet for an efficient market, it is crucial to 
uncover accurate prices. 
Energy and ancillary services markets should be well designed to maximize 
economic efficiency, improve price and investment signals, and reduce the need to 
rely upon capacity constructs to drive investment. Markets should focus compensation 
on delivered services over idle capacity (Subprinciple 1B). Attempts to increase capacity 
payments to existing generators could further distort price signals in energy and 
ancillary services markets, which could trigger additional distortionary attempts 
that lead to reduced market efficiency and increased consumer costs.42 Indeed, 
“markets that reflect the full marginal cost of reliability during periods of resource 
shortage and surplus, and therefore the full value of resource flexibility, can also 
deliver comparable reliability at lower cost to consumers.”43 However, 
many of the measures proposed to replace missing money operate outside 
of that market, on different time scales and using different parameters. 
They dilute and thus subvert the unique role energy prices can and 
should play in shaping investment in the resources needed to satisfy de-
mand for reliable supply at the lowest reasonable cost. As a result, in trying 
 
 39. See, e.g., DEVIN HARTMAN, ENHANCING MARKET SIGNALS FOR ELECTRIC RESOURCE 
ADEQUACY 2 (2017) (“Of all market options, to pay for delivered service should lower costs compared 
to procuring differentiated, specialized forms of capacity.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (upholding 
FERC’s approval of PJM’s Capacity Performance rules regarding penalties and bonuses for meeting 
performance requirements). 
 41. PETER CRAMTON & STEVEN STOFT, THE CONVERGENCE OF MARKET DESIGNS FOR 
ADEQUATE GENERATING CAPACITY WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CAISO’S RESOURCE 
ADEQUACY PROBLEM 18 (2006), http://ceepr.mit.edu/files/papers/2006-007.pdf. 
 42. MICHAEL HOGAN, HITTING THE MARK ON MISSING MONEY: HOW TO ENSURE 
RELIABILITY AT LEAST COST TO CONSUMERS 7 (2016), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/rap-hogan-hitting-mark-missing-money-2016-september.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
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to replace missing money they create a new problem: misallocated money, 
i.e., overcompensating some resources and undercompensating others.44 
C.  FERC Has Historically Preferred Competitive, Market-Based Solutions 
Since restructuring, FERC has expressed a consistent preference for competi-
tive, market-based design over administrative remedies.45 Wholesale energy mar-
kets further this preference through locational marginal prices, which “are designed 
to encourage competitive, efficient outcomes through resource offers made con-
sistent with marginal cost bidding.”46 Conversely, and as discussed below in Mar-
ket Principle 2, FERC has consistently disfavored out-of-market interventions and 
actions.47 Wholesale capacity markets exist between these two points; neither 
wholly a market nor administrative construct. As FERC has stated, “We agree . . . 
that [the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM)] is an administrative mechanism . . . . 
We disagree . . . that RPM is a return to cost-of-service ratemaking; a winning 
seller in the auctions will receive a market-based price reflecting the interplay of 
the supply bid with the demand curve.”48 
A capacity market has important benefits over wholly out-of-market interven-
tions and relies upon competitive mechanisms to a greater extent than cost-of-
service ratemaking.49 Nevertheless, it retains administratively determined ele-
ments; as FERC noted in accepting PJM’s sloped demand curve, for example, “all 
of the demand curves are administratively determined.”50 As such, wholesale ca-
pacity markets have Commission support in relation to out-of-market regimes, but 
are less market-based, and thus less Commission-preferred, than wholesale energy 
markets. 
The Commission adopted PJM’s capacity market while implicitly recognizing 
its preference for greater reliance upon wholesale energy markets. Here the Com-
mission relied upon PJM’s finding that “an administratively-determined capacity 
market is likely, of its own nature, to devolve in importance as revenues from the 
 
 44. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
 45. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, at PP 19-20 (2004); PJM Inter-
connection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 (2006) (approving PJM Reliability Pricing Model). 
 46. U.S. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, DOCKET NO. AD14-14-000, STAFF ANALYSIS OF 
ENERGY OFFER MITIGATION IN RTO AND ISO MARKETS (2014), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/2014/AD14-14-mitigation-rto-iso-markets.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, at P 20 (2004); Devon Power 
L.L.C., 103 FERC ¶ 61,082, at P 29 (2003). 
 48. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, at P 71 (2006) (initial order on 
PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model). 
 49. See generally Public Interest Organizations, Comment Letter on Proposed Grid Resiliency 
Pricing Rule (Oct. 23, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/files/2017/10/DOE-Comments-
Final.pdf at 74-78. 
 50. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, at P 105 (2006). 
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energy market increase, and enable generators to obtain sufficient revenue from 
energy sales that a capacity market mechanism may no longer be necessary.”51 Di-
minished reliance upon capacity markets was contemplated at the time of their 
adoption, with PJM arguing (and FERC agreeing): 
[C]apacity markets should diminish in importance to the extent energy 
markets in the future prove capable, standing alone, of offering adequate 
assurance of reliability. Accordingly, the RPM proposal . . . includes pro-
visions that will automatically de-emphasize the capacity market as the 
energy market proves more effective at incenting capacity resources. Spe-
cifically, PJM has designed the [Variable Resource Requirement (VRR)] 
curve to reflect changes in the level of revenues received by generators 
from the energy and ancillary services markets; this revenue offset will 
reduce capacity prices as generation owners receive more net revenue 
from other sources. As a result, the RPM design will automatically track 
any transition towards greater emphasis on energy prices, whether in 
connection with changes to the offer price cap, development of scarcity 
pricing, or evolution of load management techniques and compensation.52 
Modifications to wholesale capacity market designs that increase their significance 
in relationship to wholesale energy markets are thus contrary to the Commission’s 
initial intent and guiding framework of preferring competitive to administrative 
designs. 
II.  MARKET PRINCIPLE 2: WHEN ALTERING MARKET DESIGN,  
FERC AND ISOS SHOULD FOCUS ON ONLY THOSE SERVICES  
THAT ARE CLEARLY NEEDED AND ENSURE THAT ANY MARKET  
DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATE  
BETWEEN RESOURCES 
There are two important guideposts that should be followed when proposing 
market design changes. First, in considering design changes, FERC and ISOs 
should focus on services that are clearly needed. In doing so, FERC and ISOs 
should justify the need for a market change with a strong record of evidence. Sec-
ond, these entities should ensure that alterations do not unduly discriminate be-
tween resources to both effectuate FERC’s statutory responsibility and to further 
just and reasonable rates. To do so, FERC and ISOs should work both to allow for 
unimpeded participation by any new entrants and to ensure market access is com-
mensurate to a resource’s ability to compete. Both of these strategies facilitate 
more efficient and competitive markets, and therefore procure the lowest cost ser-
vice to consumers. 
 
 51. Id. at P 170 (quoting PJM’s filing proposing a reliability pricing model). 
 52. Id. 
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A.  FERC Should Carefully Assess and Justify the  
Need for Any Market Proposal 
Before recommending or implementing an action, particularly those actions 
involving out-of-market interventions, FERC and ISOs must carefully weigh 
whether the action is truly needed. Rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis that 
demonstrates how the intervention is responsive to the market design issue identified should 
accompany and underlie any proposal (Subprinciple 2A). An action should not be ap-
proved unless the need for the change can be rigorously demonstrated and the pro-
ponent of the change can “clearly articulate how [the change] will improve the 
market.”53 “[I]nput from diverse stakeholders, including public interest organiza-
tions and resources,” is one important way for both ISOs and FERC to ensure that 
they are properly weighing whether a market change is needed.54 From a consumer 
perspective, a market intervention is economically justified only if it protects con-
sumers from market power or if its total consumer benefits exceed its total con-
sumer costs. 
Additionally, ensuring that market rules are technology-, fuel-, and resource-
neutral should be a north star for FERC and ISOs. A properly functioning market 
will procure the least-cost set of resources that fulfills the specific grid needs. 55 
When the solution is a new service to be provided, ISOs and FERC should define 
that service in as granular or specific a manner as possible.56 ISOs and FERC 
should also justify the need for the new service and demonstrate its absence under 
existing conditions. Solutions that can be directly integrated into the energy mar-
ket, like an operating reserve demand curve, should be given preference.57 By di-
rectly integrating the service within the energy market, the solution increases the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the energy market58 and supports Market Princi-
ple 1. These types of narrowly tailored, market-oriented solutions reduce the role 
 
 53. Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See, e.g., ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 21 (2018) (“A capacity market 
should . . . result in the selection of the least-cost set of resources that possess the attributes sought by 
the markets . . . .”). 
 56. See Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
 57. See WILLIAM HOGAN, RESOURCE ADEQUACY MANDATES AND SCARCITY PRICING 
(“BELTS AND SUSPENDERS”) 6 (Feb. 23, 2006), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_PJM_
Energy_Market_022306.pdf (“An effective operating reserves demand curve with simultaneous deter-
mination of energy and reserve prices could provide several advantages in addition to sending better 
signals for investment. An operating reserve demand curve would provide an effective administrative 
tool for incorporating scarcity prices that would be necessary to provide adequate incentives for in-
creased energy demand bidding. Hence, this could help ‘jumpstart’ the demand side of the market. Fur-
ther, by introducing some ‘elasticity’ in total energy and reserve demand, the operating reserve demand 
curve would make a contribution similar to demand bidding in lessening the incentives to exercise mar-
ket power.”). 
 58. See Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
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of administratively and subjectively determining what types of resources or tech-
nologies should solve a particular issue and avert the potential for a discriminatory 
or preferential impact.59 
To justify a market intervention, FERC requires substantial evidence in the 
record to support the necessity of the rule change.60 This requirement should be 
considered a floor, as voluminous evidence ameliorates many potential harmful ef-
fects. Lack of evidence can, for instance, undermine FERC’s longstanding efforts 
to increase and protect market competition by adopting rules that unduly discrimi-
nate against or give preference to certain types of resources. This has the effect of 
stifling access and development of a diverse set of resources that are needed to in-
crease competitiveness and lower costs to ratepayers.61 Likewise, it can prevent in-
terested parties from holding FERC accountable when it has failed to fulfill its 
statutory obligations to prevent undue discrimination and preference in the mar-
ket. If FERC fails to provide a detailed explanation of its decision based on the 
factual record to support its finding on undue discrimination, outside parties are 
unable to adequately assess the underlying rationale of FERC’s decision. Without 
such analysis, stakeholder opportunity for full analysis and assessment before 
FERC becomes impossible. Interested parties instead are given incentive (as the 
only recourse available) to seek court review. 
 
 59. When the energy/ancillary services market does not yet price a particular service or product 
and therefore cannot be directly integrated into the market, administrative procurement by an ISO may 
be required for that product to ensure grid stability. However, that kind of administrative procurement 
should be temporary and discontinued when the energy/ancillary services market can value that product 
and cost-effectively incorporate it into its scheme. When the demand for the product is established and 
a revenue stream is available for it in the market, then that product should be procured competitively in 
order to leverage the market forces to provide the service more efficiently and minimize costs for con-
sumers. Additionally, not all resources are equally capable of providing a particular energy service such 
as frequency regulation. Bundling several services into a single product (or requiring resources to pro-
vide some services, which effectively bundles them) may compromise efficiency of the markets by creat-
ing obstacles for participation for certain resources. When unbundled, a service may be procured at a 
lower cost in the market. See generally Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 156 FERC ¶ 61,226 at PP 1, 3 
(2016) (approving CAISO’s proposed market design that would replace the “flexible ramping con-
straint” it imposed “to address issues arising from the lack of flexible ramping capability while it devel-
oped a new, market-based flexible ramping product”). 
 60. For an example of where FERC required this substantial evidence and determined there 
was undue discrimination, see Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1841 (2016) (“As the Court noted, FERC compiled a lengthy record that existing 
conditions resulted in inadequate demand response participation. Order 719 was designed to ‘eliminate barri-
ers to the participation of demand response in the organized power markets by ensuring comparable 
treatment of resources.’ In turn, Order 719 was based on the policy established in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 that, ‘unnecessary barriers to demand response participation in energy, capacity and ancillary 
service markets shall be eliminated.’ This Congressional policy statement is itself not a jurisdictional 
limit, but does provide further support for FERC’s action. Then, Order 745 found that policy inade-
quate, and fixed the level of compensation to remove the barriers to demand response participation.” 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). 
 61. See Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35). 
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B.  The Commission Has Recognized the Connection Between Preventing  
Undue Discrimination and Ensuring Just and Reasonable Rates 
FERC is required by law to ensure “just and reasonable” and not “unduly dis-
criminatory or preferential” rates, terms, and conditions for reliable electricity.62 
The Commission generally favors solutions that ensure reliability in a manner that 
is both not unduly discriminatory/preferential and at a just and reasonable rate.63 
The Commission also favors market-based solutions to this same end, be it in the 
context of reliability compensation or in determining wholesale prices, stating: 
 
In a competitive market, prices do not differ for new and old plants or for 
efficient and inefficient plants; commodity markets clear at prices based 
on location and timing of delivery, not the vintage of the production 
plants used to produce the commodity. Such competitive market mecha-
nisms provide important economic advantages to electricity customers in 
comparison with cost of service regulation. For examples, a competitive 
market with a single, market-clearing price creates incentives for sellers to 
minimize their costs, competition among them keeps prices as low as pos-
sible. While an efficient seller may, at times, receive revenues that are 
above its average total costs, the revenues to an inefficient seller may be 
below its average total costs and it may be driven out of business. This 
market result benefits customers, because over time it results in an indus-
try with more efficient sellers and lower prices.64 
 
The Commission likewise favors technology-neutral designs, both to enforce 
its legal mandate of not unduly discriminatory or preferential rates and to further 
its just and reasonableness mandate.65 While these two obligations are independent 
of each other, FERC has noted an explicit connection between discrimina-
tion/preference and just and reasonableness, stating, 
 
we continue to believe that perceptions of discrimination are significant 
impediments to competitive markets. Efficient and competitive markets 
will develop only if market participants have confidence that the system 
 
 62. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012). 
 63. Id. 
 64. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC 61,331, at P 141 (2006). 
 65. E.g., Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 121 FERC 
¶ 61,297, at P 215 (2007) (“The Commission made clear in Order No. 890 that advanced technologies 
and demand-side resources must be treated comparably where appropriate in the transmission planning 
process and, thus, the transmission provider’s consideration of solutions should be technology neu-
tral.”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 167 FERC ¶ 61,058, at P 59 (2019) (FERC agreeing “with com-
menters that a technology-neutral approach ensures that no resource that can perform the same service 
is unnecessarily excluded from fast-start pricing treatment”). 
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is administered fairly. Lack of market confidence resulting from the per-
ception of discrimination is not mere rhetoric. It has real-world conse-
quences for market participants and consumers.66 
 
FERC should guard against undue discrimination, both in perception and ef-
fect, particularly when it manifests through inadequate access for particular re-
sources to compete in market structures. For example, in finding PJM’s existing 
market rules unjust and unreasonable in a 2006 Order, the Commission stated that 
the existing construct “does not enable market participants to see the reliability 
problems in particular locations, does not provide price signals that would elicit 
solutions to reliability problems in enough time before the problems occur, and 
does not allow transmission and demand response to compete.”67 In a later ruling evaluat-
ing PJM’s proposal in response to FERC’s 2006 Order, the Commission noted 
that “the rules for demand response participation in RPM are an integral part of 
the new capacity construct.”68 
C.  Reducing Barriers to New Entrants and Preventing Undue Discrimination 
Furthers FERC’s Mandate of Ensuring Just and Reasonable Rates 
FERC has encouraged and facilitated the development of organized electricity 
markets under the theory that “[c]ompetition in wholesale electricity markets is the 
best way to protect the public interest and ensure that electricity ratepayers pay the 
lowest price possible for reliable service.”69 One of FERC’s foundational tenets to 
ensure a competitive market is that the market must be free of undue discrimina-
tion or preference.70 Unduly discriminatory or preferential actions, such as arbi-
trarily preventing participation of certain resources, strike at the heart of the com-
petitive market.71 Such actions are anticompetitive by their very nature and can 
 
 66. Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35). 
 67. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, at P 29 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 68. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at P 134 (2006). 
 69. Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35); see also id. (“Thus, we believe that appropriate RTOs could successfully address the existing 
impediments to efficient grid operation and competition and could consequently benefit consumers 
through lower electricity rates resulting from a wider choice of services and service providers. In addi-
tion, substantial cost savings are likely to result from the formation of RTOs.”). 
 70. The undue discrimination or preference doctrine has developed and been adapted over dec-
ades in the face of the fundamental changes that occurred in the power sector. It began with a focus on 
actions by individual market participants (i.e., whether an individual market participant’s actions were 
unduly discriminatory) and has evolved to a broader analysis of whether specific design components of 
wholesale markets have a discriminatory or preferential impact. See generally Eisen, supra note 60 (dis-
cussing the origins and modern application of the undue discrimination mandate). 
 71. Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35). 
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lead to rates that are unjust or unreasonable.72 FERC seeks to reduce barriers to 
new entrants and prevent undue discrimination, which minimizes unnecessary 
costs to consumers.73 
Unstifled participation by new technologies and business models is critical to 
ensure a more efficient, and therefore competitive, marketplace for ratepayers.74 
This in turn helps ensure just and reasonable rates to consumers. When all re-
sources capable of providing a particular energy service are allowed to compete 
fairly on a resource- and technology-neutral basis, the consumer can acquire the 
service at the lowest cost. Thus, all resources that have the ability to provide an identi-
fied needed service should be allowed to compete to do so in order to minimize costs to con-
sumers (Subprinciple 2B).75 Any attempt to favor a particular resource over others 
can hinder competition and result in higher costs for consumers. 
 
 72. See Promoting Wholesale Competition, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080, at 119 (1996); Eisen, supra note 
60, at 1817 (“In FERC’s major contemporary rulemakings, the focus is on whether the market system 
has systemic shortcomings, creating discrimination. This interpretive evolution is not surprising. 
FERC’s authority to oversee markets for discrimination is directly comparable to the original goal of 
regulation: remedying anti-competitive behavior. It continues the agency focus, dating to the [Interstate 
Commerce Act (ICA)], on protecting consumers by fostering awareness of matters that can directly 
influence rates, and curbing or checking those actions that cause undue discrimination among classes of 
market participants and as a result cause rates to be unjust or unreasonable.”). 
 73. Over the past decade, the Commission has undertaken several actions to promote competi-
tion by removing barriers to entry that come from existing tariff rules that do not account for their “op-
erational character” and therefore limit their ability to participate by “preclud[ing] them from providing 
certain services that they are technically capable of providing.” Electric Storage Participation, 162 
FERC ¶ 61,127, at P 11 (2018). These rules emphasize the “just and reasonable” mandate as their ra-
tionale (and indeed the Supreme Court has focused on that mandate, see Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. 
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 U.S. 760, 771 (2015)), but are also premised on the need to ensure not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential rates. Both the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Order No. 
841, regarding Electricity Storage Resources, and Orders No. 719 and 745, pertaining to demand re-
sponse resources, note implicitly that reducing barriers also ensures that this latter mandate is met. 
Electric Storage Participation, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 157 FERC ¶ 61, 121, at P 14 (proposed 
November 17, 2016) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R pt. 35); Demand Response Compensation in Organized 
Wholesale Energy Markets, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187, at PP 8-9 (2011); Wholesale Competition in Regions 
with Organized Electric Markets, 125 FERC 61,071, at P 13 (2008). Notably, sitting Commissioner 
Glick has endorsed the view that “elimination of barriers” to market entry is “required not only by 
[FERC’s] statutory mandate to ensure just and reasonable rates, but also by the [FPA’s] prohibition 
against undue discrimination or preference.” Richard Glick, Commissioner, Statement on Electric Stor-
age Participation in Markets Operated by RTOs and ISOs (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/
media/statements-speeches/glick/2018/02-15-18-glick-E-1.pdf. In his opinion, where resources are tech-
nically able to provide a market service, “maintenance of barriers to these resources’ participation in the 
wholesale market is, on its face, discriminatory and preferential.” Id. 
 74. See Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
 75. See id.; See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, WORKING PAPER ON STANDARDIZED 
TRANSMISSION SERVICE AND WHOLESALE ELECTRIC MARKET DESIGN 6 (Mar. 14, 2002), 
http://nedri.raabassociates.org/Articles/FERCSMDwkgPprMarch15.pdf (“The lessons learned in exist-
ing markets lead us to establish a set of principles to guide the development of standard market de-
sign . . . . Market rules must be technology- and fuel-neutral. They must not unduly bias the choice 
between demand or supply sources nor provide competitive advantages or disadvantages to large or 
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Barriers to entry and/or preferential treatment may be facilitated by the exist-
ence of regulatory capture in the ISO stakeholder process.76 Regulatory capture is 
a process by which the regulated industry directs regulation away from the public 
interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry itself.77 Critics further 
describe regulatory capture as the ability of one regulated entity to effectively 
wield regulatory power to block the entry or success of other regulated entities.78 
Regulatory capture in the ISO stakeholder processes could manifest itself as an in-
cumbency bias because incumbent stakeholders have much greater influence over 
market rule changes. And they have incentives to spur rule changes that will bene-
fit themselves at the expense of new entry or other resources with less influence in 
the stakeholder process.79 ISOs allow stakeholders to vote to set the agenda for 
proposals.80 Given that incumbent stakeholders are generally large companies with 
many affiliates, they can collaborate to pool votes and “prevent rule changes that 
promote competition from other resources.”81 Additionally, because incumbent 
stakeholders are often large companies, they are in a better position to expend the 
resources necessary for successful participation in the stakeholder process, includ-
ing time, money, and technical expertise.82 To the extent that such a bias exists or 
could exist in the future, FERC’s role in reviewing for unduly discriminatory or 
preferential impacts of a rule change becomes even more important.83 While dif-
ferences in treatment are not outright prohibited,84 any such treatment must be 
justified with specific facts that support why the treatment is not unduly discrimi-
natory or preferential. 
 
small demand or supply sources. Demand resources and intermittent supply resources should be able to 
participate fully in energy, ancillary services and capacity markets.”). 
 76. See generally CHRISTINA SIMEONE, PJM GOVERNANCE: CAN REFORMS IMPROVE 
OUTCOMES? 37 (2017), https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/PJM%20Governance%20
Reforms.pdf (detailing how affiliate voting in the ISO process allows industry incumbents to set the 
proposal agenda). 
 77. THE TOBIN PROJECT, PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 13 (Daniel Carpenter & Da-
vid A. Moss eds., 2014). 
 78. Id. at 1. 
 79. See Simeone, supra note 76, at 37 (“It is rational for incumbent generation interests to sup-
port rules that increase capacity prices in an effort to maximize profits. Policies that reduce supply or 
increase demand can lead to higher capacity prices.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 39. 
 83. Id. at 37 (“[A] wide range of interests note the theoretical potential for incumbent interests 
to dominate RTO/ISO stakeholder processes, to the detriment of competition and efficient out-
comes.”). FERC can combat this by reviewing rules for their potential unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential impacts. 
 84. See Eisen, supra note 60, at 1808-09 (“As under the ICA, ‘undue’ or ‘unreasonable’ discrimi-
nation was prohibited, but not all rate differences. If ‘the record exhibit[ed] factual differences to justi-
fy . . . differences among the rates charged,’ courts would not upset FERC’s findings that utilities’ rate 
differences were justified.”). 
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FERC and ISOs should remain especially vigilant in preventing specious at-
tempts to unjustifiably increase revenues for a particular class of stakeholders or 
resources. This becomes more difficult for FERC and ISOs when a proposal is 
founded upon a legitimate market concern but advances a suboptimal solution that 
predominantly benefits specific (and particularly, incumbent) interests.85 When a 
solution for a legitimate market concern is proposed, it is critical to precisely iden-
tify and define that concern. Proposed market design changes should explicitly identify 
the precise issue targeted by the proposed change and rigorously analyze that issue to identify 
whether a more narrowly tailored approach is capable of solving the specified issue (Sub-
principle 2C). This in turn should enable decision-makers to identify and adopt nar-
rowly tailored solutions to the specific issue. For this same reason, compensation 
should be provided for “exactly and only the services needed to maintain a nimble 
and reliable grid.”86 A resource-neutral, narrowly tailored solution minimizes the 
impact of market intervention (or more preferably utilizes only in-market solutions 
or changes) and decreases the likelihood that it may have an unforeseen discrimina-
tory or preferential impact. 
As wholesale markets continue to evolve with new technologies and business 
models, FERC must continually focus on ensuring that the existing market design 
and rules do not unduly discriminate against new entry or provide preferential 
treatment to existing resources. If a market rule change is likely to have a discriminato-
ry or preferential impact, rigorous effort should be made to identify non-discriminatory al-
ternative solutions (Subprinciple 2D). FERC can more ably meet this goal by inviting 
and closely considering significant evidence. 
However, differential treatment alone is insufficient evidence that a particular 
action should be prohibited. There are instances where resource access to markets 
may require different rules, respective of that resource’s particular attributes, to 
allow it the ability to fairly compete. For example, FERC exhibited skepticism that 
a preexisting PJM six hour minimum run time rule should be applied to demand 
response, stating that “it is not clear that the prior six hour requirement should be 
simply transferred to the capacity market, since such a requirement may not be 
necessary to achieve the goals of the capacity market and may unnecessarily pre-
clude demand resources from participating in the capacity market.”87 Emerging 
technologies and business models should receive commensurate access to markets to enable a 
more economic and efficient marketplace for ratepayers (Subprinciple 2E). As they did in 
the case above, FERC should closely scrutinize any ISO rule that appears to undu-
 
 85. See, e.g., Public Interest Organizations, Protest Letter on Open Access Transmission Tariff 
and Reliability Assurance Agreement Changes (the “205 Filing”) (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=13745945). PJM proposed a series of 
changes to its capacity market in 2016 to reduce the gap between “capacity commitments and actual 
performance.” Id. at 3, 6. 
 86. See Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
 87. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at P 132 (2006). 
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ly discriminate against new technologies to ensure that the rule is an adequately 
justified departure from market principles. 
III.  MARKET PRINCIPLE 3: MINIMIZE INTERVENTIONS THAT  
DISTORT TRANSPARENT AND ACCURATE PRICING 
FERC and ISOs should minimize interventions and rule changes that distort 
transparent and accurate pricing. To do so, these entities should implement in-
market solutions, which do not mask price signals in the way out-market solutions 
can. Where intervention is needed, in order to prevent price distortion, FERC and 
ISOs should consider the frequency and unintended consequences such interven-
tion could spur in the future. FERC should also emphasize targeted, market-based 
solutions in any intervention. 
A.  The Commission is Generally Disinclined to  
Rely Upon Out-of-Market Interventions 
Out-of-market interventions, such as RMR contracts,88 have the potential to 
distort price signals and undermine competition. Experts Eric Gimon and Robbie 
Orvis explain that “[b]y providing signals for entry and exit, markets efficiently 
calibrate the careful relationship between short-term and long-term energy market 
roles, but these signals can take some time to have their full effect.”89 FERC and ISOs 
should be particularly cautious when considering non-market interventions. When 
interventions or changes are necessary, in-market solutions are preferable since 
they rely on markets to produce the most efficient outcomes.90 Out-of-market inter-
vention is generally disfavored relative to in-market intervention (Subprinciple 3A). 
These types of interventions are less preferable since they lack transparency, can 
mask price signals, and lead to inefficient market outcomes. For instance, ISOs 
have consistently tweaked (and at times outright overhauled) their capacity mar-
kets through administrative interventions rather than allowing the market to 
work.91 Such interventions can cause markets to “struggle to operate efficiently” 
 
 88. See Gilroy Energy Ctr., supra note 28. 
 89. Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 90. Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35), at 3 (“Competition in wholesale electricity markets is the best way to protect the public interest 
and ensure that electricity consumers pay the lowest price possible for reliable service.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Wilson Comments, supra note 25, at 5-6 (“For instance, in PJM, there have been 
multiple changes to the capacity construct’s rules in recent years that result in upward pressure on pric-
es: a strengthened MOPR; stricter rules on demand response participation and hard limits on seasonal 
resources; stricter rules and hard limits on capacity imports; redesign of the capacity demand curve, 
increasing capacity purchases; changes to the Net CONE calculation, sharply increasing its value; 
changes to the capacity product with more stringent eligibility requirements and higher penalties; and 
relaxation of offer caps for supplier market power mitigation.”). 
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even as they are capable of “adjust[ing] over time to shifts in costs and state poli-
cies.”92 As described in Market Principle 1, masked price signals can lead to an 
oversupply of capacity, which then leads to lower prices in both the capacity and 
energy markets, creating a vicious cycle of intervention begetting distorted prices, 
which begets further intervention.93 
When intervention is implemented, it should be narrowly tailored and rely upon mar-
ket principles and mechanisms (Subprinciple 3B). Any changes should be resource neu-
tral and narrowly tailored to address the identified market issue, without creating 
unintended consequences or the need for future interventions. Reliance upon or 
mimicking of market mechanisms to the extent possible can help to reduce unde-
sirable secondary effects,94 as opposed to incorporating additional administrative 
mechanisms.95 Locational pricing to help improve price signals offers a useful ex-
ample. PJM’s early capacity market design lacked a locational price component that 
could account for the inability of some capacity to be delivered everywhere in PJM 
due to transmission constraints.96 This lack of locational pricing meant a lack of 
price signals to illustrate where new investment was most needed.97 To solve this 
issue, FERC relied on an intervention that incorporated a more granular, location-
al pricing component consistent with the market principles already underlying the 
capacity market design.98 Thus, this market design change was not a drastic over-
haul of the existing design, but rather a narrowly tailored solution that relied on 
market mechanisms to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the market. 
 
 92. Id. at 6. 
 93. See Roques, Newberry & Nuttall, supra note 34, at 100 (“Any regulatory intervention re-
quires caution, since it may introduce secondary side-effects or perverse bidding incentives making fur-
ther regulatory intervention self-perpetuating.”). 
 94. See JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER, KATHLEEN SPEES & ADAM SCHUMACHER, A 
COMPARISON OF PJM’S RPM WITH ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND CAPACITY MARKET DESIGN 73 
(2009) (“A concern associated with implementing forward capacity markets is their complexity, which 
imposes considerable implementation costs and risk of unintended design flaws on both system opera-
tors and market participants.”). 
 95. See WILLIAM HOGAN, RESOURCE ADEQUACY MANDATES AND SCARCITY PRICING 
(“BELTS AND SUSPENDERS”) 3 (Feb. 23, 2006), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_PJM_
Energy_Market_022306.pdf (“Improvements in pricing for energy and ancillary services markets would 
reinforce the objectives of  RPM. In the current market design, locational marginal pricing (LMP) is 
recognized as simplifying the task of transmission congestion management. For similar reasons, im-
proved energy scarcity pricing would provide better real-time incentives for reliability given whatever 
investment the RPM supports. Without adequate scarcity pricing, the system operator will be com-
pelled to invoke inadequate substitutes for scarcity pricing through administrative penalties and contin-
ued reliance on special arrangements like reliability must run (RMR) contracts and ‘Maximum Emer-
gency’ out-of-market purchases.”). 
 96. See PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, at P 22 (2006). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
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Bifurcated market design proposals99 are emblematic of actions that can depart 
from these tenets. ISO-NE and PJM bifurcated market design proposals, which are 
premised on the assertion that state public policies are suppressing prices in capaci-
ty markets, serve as one example. The proposals assert that artificially low prices 
negatively impact the profitability of non-public-policy-supported resources, ob-
scuring price formation.100 
Necessary to the bifurcated market design proposals, then, is identification of 
what constitutes a state-public-policy-supported or -subsidized resource.101 That is, 
a definition of what constitutes a subsidy must first be determined in order to im-
plement a bifurcated market design. However, formation of a consensus as to what 
constitutes a subsidy has proven difficult and subject to arbitrary determinations.102 
In recent bifurcated market proposals, the definition of subsidy has been at issue. 
First, in ISO-NE’s “Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources” 
(CASPR) proposal, parties argued that CASPR’s “definition of Sponsored Policy 
Resources [was] unduly discriminatory” and questioned why “the definition of 
Sponsored Policy Resource reflect[ed] some government policy preferences, such 
as state renewable and clean energy policies, but not others, such as the preference 
 
 99. A bifurcated market design refers to a tranched market, treating resources or resource-
owners differently depending upon certain (and necessarily subjective) regulatory determinations. For 
example, ISO-NE created a bifurcated market in which capacity commitments were obtained by exist-
ing resources in the primary auction, and then those existing generators who obtained those obligations 
could sell them to new resources seeking to enter the capacity markets without being impacted by the 
MOPR in place in a secondary, or “substitution,” auction. ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, 
at P 7 (2018). Likewise, PJM’s capacity repricing proposal, which FERC rejected, sought to bifurcate 
the capacity market so that quantity of supply was determined in one auction, and the price determined 
in a second. Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 64 (2018). 
 100. See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 150 (2018) (“[PJM’s existing tariff] fails to 
protect the integrity of competition in the wholesale capacity market against unreasonable price distor-
tions and cost shifts caused by out-of-market support to keep existing uneconomic resources in opera-
tion, or to support the uneconomic entry of new resources, regardless of the generation type or quantity 
of the resources supported by such out-of-market support. The resulting price distortions compromise 
the capacity market’s integrity. In addition, these price distortions create significant uncertainty, which 
may further compromise the market, because investors cannot predict whether their capital will be 
competing against resources that are offering into the market based on actual costs or on state subsi-
dies.”); ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 5 (2018) (“[Out-of-market actions] negatively 
impact the market’s ability to compensate needed existing resources.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at 6-7 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) 
(commenting on majority’s “picking and choosing which policies to frustrate and which to willfully ig-
nore” in applying the MOPR). 
 102. See, e.g., ANGELA PACHON & CHRISTINA SIMEONE, RECONCILING SUBSIDIZED 
RESOURCES IN PJM’S COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS: PROCEEDINGS REPORT 3 (2017), 
https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/proceedingsreports/Reconciling%20Subsidized
%20Resources.pdf (“How Should Subsidies Be Defined? What subsidies materially impact market out-
comes? While all subsidies may be inconsistent with efficient market outcomes, there may be a dividing 
line between the subsidies that are materially important and those that are immaterial. Does an invento-
ry of all potentially applicable subsidies need to be developed? Is a materiality test for the subsidies, as 
well as their impacts on the market, needed when assessing market design options?”). 
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of public power entities.”103 Likewise, in the case of PJM’s “Capacity Repricing” 
proposal, the market was bifurcated between resources receiving a “Material Sub-
sidy” and those that were not.104 However, some questioned whether this term had 
been given the proper definition and scope,105 with some chiding PJM for limiting 
relevant subsidies to only those provided by states, rather than including federal 
subsidies as well.106 The dissent also challenged the Commission’s alternative pro-
posal for its exclusion of non-environmentally-related state subsidies for coal and 
natural gas on its list of “actionable state policies.”107 
Thus, any market intervention proposals that rely upon repricing contain a 
crucial element (i.e., the definition of subsidy that is needed to know when to trig-
ger repricing) that is administratively determined and difficult to solve given the 
ambiguous and arbitrary nature of the term. Such proposals, which treat resources 
and their value arbitrarily, subject markets to arbitrary, rather than economic, de-
terminations, creating the potential for price distortion. Interventions should therefore 
be feasible to implement and not contain elements that rely on abstract concepts or arbitrary 
distinctions that hinder implementation (Subprinciple 3C). This illustrates another sig-
nificant issue: market interventions tend to lead to further market interventions,108 
and continuous and frequent intervention distorts prices. Bifurcated market design 
proposals, which necessarily require an imprecise definition of subsidy, may thus 
require further interventions to modify the definition.109 Interventions should resolve 
the identified market failure without creating symptomatic incentives or the need for future 
market interventions (Subprinciple 3D). For these reasons, bifurcated market de-
signs—to the extent they contravene these subprinciples—should generally be dis-
favored. 
In sum, non-market intervention can lead to price distortion and should be 
avoided. “Past experience suggests that rather than retire during times of low reve-
nue, [units that would otherwise retire] push for further capacity market tweaks to 
 
 103. ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 31 (2018). 
 104. Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 35 (2018) 
 105. Id. at P 50 (“Intervenors also question the appropriateness of PJM’s proposed definition of a 
Material Subsidy. [Two Intervenors] state that the definition gives PJM too much discretion. [Others] 
argue the proposed definition is too broad.”). 
 106. Id. at P 19. 
 107. Id. at 8 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 108. See Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14 (noting the “vicious cycle of market ‘fixes’”). 
 109. See Clean Energy Advocates, Request for Rehearing of PJM Capacity Market Order (July 
30, 2018), at 20-21 (describing how undefined definitions of subsidy and out-of-market action will ulti-
mately lead to further market interventions down the road); ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC 
¶ 61,205, at P 30 (2018) (“ISO-NE represents, however, that if state policies change in the future, it 
will work with stakeholders to determine if the new laws can and should be accommodated by 
CASPR.”); CASPR is a bifurcated market in which “ISO-NE . . . will conduct the annual [Forward 
Capacity Auction] in two stages.” Id. at P 7. 
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increase revenue.”110 The increased revenue caused by such market tweaks allow 
these resources to remain in the market longer than economically justified.111 This 
leads to suppressed prices in both the capacity and energy markets, and prevents 
the market from equilibrating at an efficient level.112 It also leads to an overall in-
crease in costs to ratepayers.113 
B.  FERC and ISOs Should Proceed with Caution in Evaluating Any  
Market Intervention, and Consider Both the Frequency and  
Unintended Consequences of Intervention 
In assessing any potential market intervention, both the frequency and possi-
bility of unintended consequences should be considered.114 It is important to spark 
 
 110. Gimon & Orvis, supra note 14. 
 111. See Statement of American Public Power Association, Quadrennial Energy Review, Second 
Installment, Electricity: Generation to End-Use, Boston Regional Meeting, at 4 (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/04/f30/Panel%203%20Remarks%20by%20Edward%20Tatum
%2C%20Jr.%2C%20Vice%20President%20Transmission%2C%20American%20Municipal%20
Power_0.pdf (“The RTOs have continually tweaked the rules in an attempt to address increasing relia-
bility concerns . . . . Often these rule changes have not improved the markets, but instead have simply 
increased the revenue paid to owners of existing generation resources, who have a strong interest in 
maintaining a regime that limits competition from new entrants and props up capacity prices . . . .”). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See HIBBARD ET AL., supra note 27, at 63 (“The retirement of aging resources is a natural 
element of efficient and competitive market forces, and where markets are performing well, these re-
tirements mainly represent the efficient exit of uncompetitive assets, and will lead to lower electricity 
prices for consumers over time.”). 
Bifurcated market design proposals, premised on the idea that out-of-market interventions are ar-
tificially suppressing capacity market prices, see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text, also illus-
trate a need to ensure that the correct concern is identified early and explicitly. The symptoms of con-
cern, low wholesale market prices, could be attributed to a number of causes, including that retirement 
signals are an intended outcome of a well-functioning and currently oversupplied market. Id. (“Funda-
mental market forces – flat demand for electricity, low natural gas prices and the addition of highly effi-
cient new gas-fired resources – are primarily responsible for altering the profitability of many older, 
merchant generating assets in the parts of the country with wholesale competitive markets administered 
by RTOs.”). In fact, the retirement of uncompetitive power plants should be expected in a well-
functioning power market; if higher cost, inefficient power plants are not retiring, it is a sign that com-
petition might be an issue in the market leading to unjustifiably higher rates for ratepayers. Id.; see also 
Joseph Bowring, Independent Market Monitor, Statement on PJM Interconnection L.L.C., at 2 (May 
1, 2017) [hereinafter Bowring Statement] (“As a result of competition from low cost gas and the associ-
ated entry of new, efficient gas-fired combined cycle units, energy market prices have fallen to historic 
lows and capacity market prices have been moderate. Competition has made some formerly baseload 
units uneconomic. Many uneconomic units have retired . . . .”). 
 114. See PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., supra note 94, at 73 (“A concern associated with implementing 
forward capacity markets is their complexity, which imposes considerable implementation costs and risk 
of unintended design flaws on both system operators and market participants.”). 
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investment in needed resources, and market interventions may hinder this goal.115 
Every intervention creates risk for investors.116 The more frequently interventions 
occur, the more difficult it is for investors to make an informed decision on wheth-
er and where to invest in the power sector.117 Frequent interventions create a risk 
that, by the time the investment is realized, the plant will be operating under a dif-
ferent set of rules than when the investment decision was made.118 This uncertain-
ty leads to higher financing costs for power plant development, which is either 
passed on to consumers as higher energy costs or deters new entry entirely that 
would otherwise be economical.119 Thus, efforts to reduce the frequency of market 
interventions should lead to more just and reasonable rates for ratepayers because 
these efforts should lead to more certainty for investors. When a market design 
flaw that affects the efficiency and competitiveness of the market is identified, the 
proposed solution should resolve the issue without causing other unintended (and 
potentially bigger) inefficiencies. Otherwise, the proposed solution will necessitate 
further intervention, which could compromise the efficiency of the market, create 
uncertainty and risks, and lead to needlessly higher prices for consumers.120 
It is of further importance to consider the frequency and unintended conse-
quences of intervention when implementing out-of-market interventions, which 
often lack transparency and do not rely on market principles and mechanisms, and 
therefore are at greater risk of leading to economically inefficient outcomes. Such 
administrative interventions can undermine the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the market, discouraging competitive entry by masking price signals and deterring 
 
 115. See Roques, Newberry & Nuttall, supra note 34, at 120 (“There is a delicate trade-off to be 
found between governance adaptability and flexibility in a relatively new electricity markets and inves-
tors’ need for predictability. As the market matures, adaptability and reactivity of the regulatory frame-
work is critical for maintaining security of supply.”). 
 116. Id. (“Regulatory uncertainty is one of the major sources of risk for investors in a fast trans-
forming regulatory framework. One straightforward way to improve investment incentives is for the 
government to adopt sustainable market rules, and carefully review the necessity of any change.” (inter-
nal citations omitted)). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at 5 n.13 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissent-
ing) (“It is not without irony that today’s order espouses the need to promote investor confidence even 
as it fundamentally revises the purpose that the Commission’s regulation of capacity markets is de-
signed to serve. Indeed, change has been the only consistent feature of capacity markets in recent years. 
These repeated changes to the basic principles and components of capacity markets can only serve to 
undermine investors’ confidence in their assessment of the current capacity markets.”); Calpine Corp., 
163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at 11-12 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (“[I]t is ironic to bemoan policy un-
certainty when Commission’s and PJM’s constant tinkering with the capacity market is one of, if not 
the, single biggest sources of uncertainty facing capacity market participants.”). 
 119. See Bowring Statement, supra note 113, at 3 (noting that subsidies for uneconomic resources 
suppress investment in new, efficient generation technologies. This would ensure those uneconomic 
resources remain in business and prices for consumers remain high.). 
 120. Id. 
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investors, or limiting efficient exit by effectively favoring uneconomic incumbent 
resources.121 
Because of their exacerbated pricing problems and the unintended conse-
quences associated with frequent intervention, out-of-market actions by FERC and 
ISOs, such as RMR agreements, should only be taken when the benefits of meet-
ing reliability standards through an agreement exceed the costs.122 ISOs should fa-
vor cost-effective, market-based alternatives to RMR agreements when such alter-
natives will adequately meet potential reliability needs.123 Otherwise, these out-of-
market actions can result in a more costly, less innovative, less competitive, and 
less dynamic power system than would otherwise emerge over time. 
C.  FERC Has Provided a Set of Benchmarks in  
Considering Whether Intervention is Warranted 
Any proposed change should be based upon a thorough examination to ensure 
that interventions allow for accurate price signaling. FERC articulated its pre-
ferred approach for such an examination in the context of identifying reliability 
compensation issues.124 In such instances, the Commission noted that the first 
question should be: “does this organized market exhibit material short-term or 
long-term Reliability Compensation Issues?”125 Should an actual need be identi-
fied, the Commission then required that “there should be a demonstration that the 
solution proposed is feasible, implementible [sic] and expected (with a high degree 
of probability) to solve the problem.”126 That identified solution should then, if 
possible, be market-based. FERC “believe[s] that the use of market design im-
proved features is the preferred choice for solving material Reliability Compensa-
tion Issues. However, [the Agency] recognize[s] that market design changes may 
not be effective in every situation where such issues are present.”127 
 
 121. See ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at 5 n.13 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissent-
ing). 
 122. This assessment does not necessarily require a specific or actual cost-benefit analysis, and 
the Commission has authority to consider non-cost factors in this assessment. PJM Interconnection, 
L.L.C., 155 FERC ¶ 61,157, at P 30 & n.39 (2016). This cost-benefit analysis should be a “‘common-
sense assessment’ that the costs that will be incurred are consistent with the ratepayers’ overall needs 
and interests” and need not be a “quantitative cost-benefit analysis.” Id. (quoting Process Gas Consum-
ers Grp. v. FERC, 866 F.2d 470, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 123. See MICHAEL GIBERSON, INTEGRATING RELIABILITY-MUST-RUN PRACTICES  
INTO WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2017), https://2o9ub0417chl2lg6m43em6psi2i-wpengine.
netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/114-1.pdf. 
 124. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112 (2004). 
 125. Id. at P 16. 
 126. Id. at P 18. 
 127. Id. at P 20. 
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This approach is emblematic of FERC’s preference for targeted, market-based 
solutions founded upon strong evidence and identification of a specific issue, which 
are less likely to distort price signals. FERC’s general disinclination for RMR con-
tracts similarly illustrates this preference: 
Extensive use of RMR contracts undermines effective market perfor-
mance. In addition, suppressed market clearing prices further erode the 
ability of other generators to earn competitive revenues in the market and 
increase the likelihood that additional units will also require RMR 
agreements to remain profitable. Therefore, we believe that ISO-NE, ra-
ther than focusing on and using stand-alone RMR agreements, should in-
corporate the effect of those agreements into a market-type mecha-
nism.128 
FERC has similarly required ISOs to “exercise vigilance to ensure that only those 
units that are needed to ensure reliability receive RMR contracts, and that those 
contracts will not be in effect indefinitely but will be limited to the periods during 
which the units are needed for reliability.”129 
Even in cases where administrative actions are found to be required, FERC 
has shown its preference for market-based solutions by favoring designs that mimic 
market mechanisms. For instance, in approving PJM’s sloped demand curve for its 
capacity market, FERC stated that “[t]he sloping demand curve is designed to rep-
licate a true market in which incremental amounts of capacity will have gradually 
declining, but positive, reliability benefits.”130 
IV.  MARKET PRINCIPLE 4: THE JUST AND REASONABLE STANDARD 
STRONGLY FAVORS RATE DECREASING OUTCOMES 
The just and reasonable standard favors actions that decrease rates for con-
sumers. This preference is driven by both FERC’s goal to bring more efficient and 
lower cost power to consumers and its obligation to protect consumer interests.131 
Given these features, in FERC’s view the just and reasonable standard means that 
market designs and interventions should, as possible, decrease rates.132 FERC’s 
understanding of reliability, and how it should be valued, in the context of the just 
and reasonable standard illustrates this conception. 
 
 128. Devon Power L.L.C., 103 FERC ¶ 61,082, at P 29 (2003). 
 129. Id. at P 3. 
 130. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P 99 (2007). 
 131. Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35); see Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY L. J. 1, 4-5 
(2019), https://www.eba-net.org/assets/1/6/[Glick_and_Christiansen][Final].pdf. 
 132. Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35). 
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A.  FERC’s Preference for Wholesale Power Markets is Premised on the  
Goal of Bringing More Efficient, Lower Cost Power to Consumers 
In order to effectuate its mandate to ensure reliable energy at just and reason-
able rates, FERC has zealously encouraged the development of wholesale competi-
tion.133 FERC fundamentally supports competition that results from organized 
electricity markets as the best way “to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the 
Nation’s electricity consumers.”134 Effective competition in the wholesale market 
encourages entry and exit and promotes innovation, incentivizes the efficient oper-
ation of resources, and allocates risk appropriately between ratepayers and genera-
tors. Enhancing competition and removing regulatory and economic barriers that 
hinder a free market are essential to ensuring just and reasonable wholesale rates.135 
Conversely, market interventions that impede competition or shift risks from gen-
erators to ratepayers will yield unjust and unreasonable rates to ratepayers. 
Where intervention is needed, the just and reasonable standard—given 
FERC’s goal of bringing more efficient, lower cost power to consumers—favors 
evaluating alternative solutions for an identified problem from the perspective of 
the ratepayer interest. This approach favors actions that maximize net benefits 
compared to other available options. Correspondingly, if a market rule change pro-
posed by an ISO is projected to result in higher rates, the ISO should demonstrate 
that the estimated benefits exceed the additional cost to ratepayers. An interven-
tion or rule is likely to raise rates if it has certain characteristics. An intervention or 
market rule that: (a) increases costs; (b) decreases economic efficiency; (c) supports existing 
uneconomic generation unneeded for reliability services; or (d) does not further a state pub-
lic policy, should be viewed with care (Subprinciple 4A). Where these characteristics are 
apparent, FERC and ISOs should analyze whether the benefits will justify any po-
tential for higher rates. 
B.  FERC is Obligated to Protect Consumer Interest 
Wholesale electricity markets should properly compensate generation in order 
to ensure that consumers are shielded from unjust and unreasonable rates. Given 
its obligation to protect consumers, in balancing agency responsibilities, FERC has 
exhibited clear preference for increased rates only upon the basis of a strong show-
ing of necessity. Interventions and market rules that increase rates should be accompa-
nied by rigorous evidence showing how ratepayers benefit from incurred higher costs (Sub-
principle 4B). For example, in determining whether to compensate for particular 
 
 133. Id. at 3 (“The comments on the NOPR overwhelmingly support the conclusion that inde-
pendent regionally operated transmissions grids will enhance the benefits of competitive electricity 
markets. Competition in wholesale electricity markets is the best way to protect the public interest and 
ensure that electricity consumers pay the lowest price possible for reliable service.”). 
 134. Promoting Wholesale Competition, Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080, at 1 (1996). 
 135. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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reliability, FERC has stated that the first question is not whether the proposed 
ISO solution produces just and reasonable rates, but rather whether at the outset 
the “organized market exhibit[s] material short-term or long-term Reliability 
Compensation Issues.”136 Should an issue be identified, the solution “must include 
a showing that the revenue produced by the proposed solution is adequate to actu-
ally solve the problem at hand and that the proposed solution includes safeguards 
to prevent the unwarranted exercise of market power beyond the recovery of such 
necessary revenue.”137 
This same preference for protecting consumers permeates FERC’s decisions 
adopting capacity markets. In approving PJM’s sloped demand curve, the Com-
mission placed importance on PJM’s finding that: 
[w]hile customers may buy more capacity under the Settlement Curve 
than under the status quo, the price of the capacity will be lower because 
of lower financing costs. And, because more generation capacity will be in 
place, prices in the energy markets will be lower, resulting in lower ener-
gy bills to customers.138 
FERC may thus have reason to reevaluate a sloped demand curve (or any other 
design decision) to the extent that this predicted result has not occurred in prac-
tice. Indeed, a principal consideration in approving PJM’s and New York ISO’s 
(NYISO) sloped demand curves was that: 
the sloped demand curves also allow for procuring less capacity than their 
respective capacity targets. These markets are designed such that the av-
erage amount of capacity procured over time is close to the capacity tar-
get, but the actual amount procured in any one period may be higher or 
lower than the target. Allowing the procurement in excess of the capacity 
target in some periods is reasonable in these markets to offset the poten-
tial for procuring less than the capacity target in other periods.139 
Perfect information may not always exist such as to ensure with complete cer-
tainty that FERC’s action will result in lower prices. However, because of the just 
and reasonable mandate, lower prices should generally be the guiding principle by 
which FERC and courts evaluate such action. FERC’s foundational rationale for 
adopting capacity markets, for example, was that the “RPM is based on the prem-
ise that competition in properly designated geographic markets will produce just 
 
 136. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, at P 16 (2004). Although capacity mar-
ket constructs appear to have supplanted FERC’s reliance upon the Reliability Compensation Issues 
Order, the foundational inquiries contained in this Order remain relevant and are cited in PJM Inter-
connection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at P 78 (2006). 
 137. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, at P 18 (2004). 
 138. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at P 78 (2006). 
 139. ISO New England, Inc., 135 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 19 n.24 (2011). 
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and reasonable rates.”140 In this context, FERC interpreted just and reasonable 
rates as those oriented to providing consumers lower rates, relying on the D.C. 
Circuit’s finding that “empirical data may not exist for every proposition and agen-
cies may rely on predictions that competition will result in lower prices.”141 That is, 
although lower prices may not be predictable with absolute certainty, FERC may 
generally assume that competition will lower prices. FERC therefore has latitude 
when actions improve competition because there is an assumption that lowering 
prices is the goal underpinning FERC’s action. 
C.  The Value of Reliability Should be Explicitly Considered 
The principle that the just and reasonable standard favors rate decreasing out-
comes can be seen in FERC’s understanding of reliability and how that under-
standing is molded by FERC’s mandate to provide just and reasonable rates. The 
bulk power system (or its subcomponents) should meet the applicable reliability 
standards as prescribed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.142 
ISO “wholesale electric markets are designed to obtain services to reliably and effi-
ciently meet customer needs without regard to preferred fuels or technologies.”143 
When reliability services are procured in-market, markets should automatically ad-
just as reliability standards are updated or changed. Although a changed standard 
may justifiably increase rates, to ensure efficient and low-cost compliance the man-
ner in which markets operate should not be altered in response to those changed 
standards. 
When changes are necessary beyond updated reliability standards (including 
but not limited to reliability based market changes rather than standards changes), 
that intervention or market rule should generally not lead to higher rates absent a 
benefit to ratepayers that substantially justifies the additional expense.144 Should a 
potential action by FERC or ISOs be predicted to lead to higher rates for ratepay-
ers, FERC and ISOs should provide fulsome rationale supporting the higher rates. 
 
 140. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P 191 (2007). 
 141. Id. at P 74 & n.143 (citing Associated Gas Distribs. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 824 F.2d 
981, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 142. See Frank A. Felder, Watching the ISO Watchman, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2012, at 24, 26 
(“Starting with the reliability objective, there is a point at which the cost of reliability exceeds the cost 
of unreliability . . . . Embedded in reliability rules is an implicit cost of unreliability that should not be 
exceeded . . . . Given that reliability requirements are thresholds, [reliability improvements] result in 
meeting those threshold requirements at a lower cost rather than achieving a higher level of reliability at 
the same cost.”). NERC was certified by FERC under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 as the electric 
reliability organization for the U.S., and its reliability standards are mandatory and enforceable. FERC, 
ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 37 (2015). 
 143. See HIBBARD ET AL., supra note 27, at 12. 
 144. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 16,658, 16,659-60 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (explaining the importance 
of protecting customers and keeping rates just and reasonable). 
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The evidence should detail exactly why the rate increase is necessary and how rate-
payers will benefit from it.145 Only where FERC and ISOs use such an analytical 
framework can stakeholders and other interested parties effectively analyze pro-
posals and hold decision-makers accountable if they stray from core missions and 
statutory duties. 
Given FERC’s desire to bring about efficient, low-cost power and its obliga-
tion to protect consumer interest, reliability standards should be based on econom-
ic efficiency and the reliability of service should reflect customers’ willingness to 
pay for it. Accordingly, reserve margins should be supported by well justified rea-
sons, such as the Value of Lost Load (VoLL)—i.e., the “cost of an outage to cus-
tomers or the price that an average customer would be willing to pay to avoid an 
involuntary interruption of their electricity supply.”146 Having target reserve mar-
gins above VoLL obligates customers to pay more than what the incremental in-
crease in reliability is worth to them. Furthermore, when all customers are required 
to pay for higher levels of reliability than they may want, it masks the price signals 
that enable customers to choose between paying for a higher level of reliability and 
participating in demand-side solutions like price-responsive demand, emergency 
response services, load management, and distributed generation.147 
V.  MARKET PRINCIPLE 5: FERC AND ISOS SHOULD FACILITATE AND 
NOT UNDERMINE STATE PUBLIC POLICY PREFERENCES 
FERC and ISOs should pursue actions that further and respect state public 
policy preferences related to the electricity sector rather than those that will un-
dermine such preferences. The FPA is a cooperative federalism statute, which is 
designed to allow state and federal regulatory entities to work together toward a 
common goal.148 As such, FERC and ISOs should regulate the wholesale markets 
in coordination with state regulation of retail sales and generation preferences, ra-
ther than in tension with those choices. Additionally, ISOs in particular are not 
structured for policymaking because they lack political accountability.149 State leg-
 
 145. See id. 
 146. JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., RESOURCE ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS: 
RELIABILITY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 4 (2013), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2014/
02-07-14-consultant-report.pdf. 
 147. See generally FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 2018 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND  
RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING (2018), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2018/DR-
AM-Report2018.pdf. 
 148. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (“[E]xtend only to those matters which are not subject to 
regulation by the States.”). See generally Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEXAS 
L. REV. 399 (2016) (describing how courts have historically interpreted the FPA’s cooperative federal-
ism mandate). 
 149. See generally SIMEONE, supra note 76, at 2. 
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islatures, which are accountable to their electorate, are the proper forum for pursu-
ing public policy changes. 
A.  Cooperative Federalism Underpins the Energy Sector 
FERC has encouraged the development of organized electricity markets to fa-
cilitate the efficient and reliable functioning of the transmission grid.150 ISOs fur-
ther FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure just and reasonable rates by increasing 
the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets.151 States also play an im-
portant role in regulating the electricity sector because the FPA established a regu-
latory system based on the principle of cooperative federalism. States have authori-
ty over retail electricity sales and “facilities used for the generation of electric 
energy,”152 as well as general authority even where policy actions may have some 
impact upon the bulk power system.153 Occasionally, wholesale markets, through 
rule changes or other actions, risk inhibiting or obstructing valid state policy pref-
erences.154 However, because the FPA’s design intended for federal and state regu-
lators to work cooperatively, a “policy of ‘mitigating,’ rather than facilitating, state 
public policy preferences places the Commission in a role that Congress never in-
tended it to play”155 and should be disfavored.156 
 
 150. HIBBARD ET AL., supra note 27, at 12 (“[O]rganized wholesale electric markets are designed 
to obtain services to reliably and efficiently meet customer needs without regard to preferred fuels or 
technologies.”); Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35) (“The Commission also codifies minimum characteristics and functions that a transmis-
sion entity must satisfy in order to be considered an RTO. The Commission’s goal is to promote effi-
ciency in wholesale electricity markets and to ensure that electricity consumers pay the lowest price 
possible for reliable service.”); see also Promoting Wholesale Competition, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080, at 1 
(1996) (“Today the Commission issues three final, interrelated rules designed to remove impediments 
to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power 
to the Nation’s electricity consumers.”). 
 151. Promoting Wholesale Competition, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080, at 1 (1996); see also Allco Fin. Ltd. 
v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2017) (“RTOs and ISOs administer a number of competitive 
wholesale auctions. FERC extensively regulates the structure and rules of such auctions, in order to 
ensure that they produce just and reasonable results.”). 
 152. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b)(1) (“[E]xtend only to those matters which are not subject to reg-
ulation by the States.”). 
 153. Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY L. J. 1, 28-29 
(2019). 
 154. See, e.g., N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 744 F.3d 74, 106 (3d Cir. 
2014) (discussing arguments that application of a MOPR to new natural gas resources would frustrate 
New Jersey’s goals to use such resources to abate its energy crisis); id. at 95 (states arguing FERC was 
“usurp[ing] the state’s right to rely on integrated resource planning.”); New England Power Generation 
Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 757 F.3d 283, 290 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (arguing that application of 
the MOPR to state supported resources “impermissibly determine[d] the makeup of a state’s resource 
portfolio”). 
 155. ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at 2 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part 
and concurring in part). 
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Recently proposed bifurcated market designs and FERC orders are repre-
sentative of this tension.157 Proponents of these recent designs argue that state 
public policies, particularly climate policies, are suppressing prices in capacity mar-
kets.158 The proponents further argue that these artificially low prices negatively 
impact the profitability of non-public-policy-supported, or “competitive,” re-
sources, obscuring price formation.159 These interventions have mostly advocated 
for a redesign of the capacity market construct that will reprice subsidized offers to 
determine a market clearing price as if the subsidy did not exist.160 However, these 
proposed interventions mistake valid exercise of state authority for market inter-
ference. 
At their core, proposed bifurcated market interventions and FERC orders in 
response assume that state policies illegitimately affect market prices.161 Yet state 
policies, like fuel prices or property costs, are inputs beyond FERC and ISO au-
thority. The FPA explicitly reserved an important role for states in the electricity 
sector, and states have broad authority to craft public policy in support of their cit-
izens’ welfare.162 Market designs should ensure state public policy preferences are given 
full effect, but not allow manipulative behavior from any market participant (Subprinciple 
5A). As part of their traditional police powers and duties to develop and imple-
 
 156. FERC has a great deal of flexibility in crafting solutions to actually give effect to the state 
policy preference and justifying them in ways that may not lead to the most textbook economic result, 
instead “account[ing] for the practical realities of how [these] markets operate” (i.e., operating in con-
junction with policy inputs from the states). Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale 
Energy Mkts., 134 FERC ¶ 61,187, at P 46 (2011). See id. (“In the face of these diverging opinions, the 
Commission observes that, as the courts have recognized, ‘issues of rate design are fairly technical and, 
insofar as they are not technical, involve policy judgments that lie at the core of the regulatory mission.’ 
We also observe that, in making such judgments, the Commission is not limited to textbook economic 
analysis of the markets subject to our jurisdiction, but also may account for the practical realities of how 
those markets operate.”) (quoting Elec. Consumers Res. Council v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 4017 
F.3d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 157. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text. 
 158. ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 4-5 (2018) (ISO-NE arguing that state 
clean energy programs are suppressing prices); Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 1-2 (2018) 
(FERC explaining that state out-of-market payments are suppressing price of capacity procured). 
 159. See Gavin Bade, The Great Capacity Market Debate: Which model can best handle the energy 
transition?, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-great-capacity-
market-debate-which-model-can-best-handle-the-energy-tr/440657/. 
 160. E.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 34 (2018) (explaining PJM’s Capacity Re-
pricing proposal). See also N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 744 F.3d at 86-87 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (explaining application of PJM’s original MOPR from 2006, which mitigated bids found to 
be below-cost to 80-90% of the estimated CONE). 
 161. ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 24 (2018) (“This out-of-market state 
support raises a potential conflict with the Commission’s interest in maintaining efficient and competi-
tive wholesale markets . . . . Absent market mechanisms to limit the impact on FCM prices, which serve 
as both a revenue stream and a price signal for investors, these state actions can erode the investor con-
fidence on which the FCM relies to meet its objectives.”). 
 162. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b)(1) (2012). 
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ment policy desired by their constituency, states may enact laws or policies that 
impact wholesale markets. This alone does not conflict with FERC’s jurisdic-
tion.163 FERC and ISOs should be wary of actions that could have “the potential 
to erect a significant impediment to states’ efforts to shape the generation mix 
within their borders.”164 Such efforts also run afoul of the basic principles of coop-
erative federalism that underlie the FPA.165 Assuming that these state actions do 
not “surprise the market relatively last-minute with large subsidized resources,” 
they do not artificially lower or suppress prices in capacity markets.166 State poli-
cies are simply another input that the wholesale market internalizes through its ef-
ficient clearing of bids to provide capacity; they are no different than inputs such 
as the numerous costs and constraints that are already internalized by the mar-
ket.167 Wholesale markets are not an end unto themselves; they were created for 
the purpose of effectuating FERC’s statutory mandate. When state actions are 
crafted outside this purpose and FERC authority, ISOs lack authority to act in 
contravention of state choices.168 
 
 163. See Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016). 
 164. See, e.g., ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at 3 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part). 
 165. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 780; William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of 
Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 883-84 (2016) 
(“If ever a sector should be regulated top-to-bottom by the federal government, one might argue, it is 
electricity. Congress clearly recognized this possibility when it enacted Part II of the FPA in 1935. It 
could have gone much further than it did in extending its authority under the commerce power to regu-
late electricity. But it chose not to do so precisely because of the value it placed on state regulation. And 
although Congress has adjusted the structure and practice of electricity regulation since 1935, it has re-
frained from disturbing the basic jurisdictional scheme despite passing four major pieces of omnibus 
energy legislation since 1978.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 166. See Wilson Comments, supra note 25, at 5 (“[S]tate actions that surprise the market relative-
ly last-minute with large subsidized resources may inappropriately affect capacity prices. But state ac-
tions that result in resources entering the market in relatively small quantities that are foreseen years in 
advance do not.”). 
 167. See id. (“Market participants have plenty of time to take [public policy resources announced 
far in advance] into account in planning the timing of retirements, other new entry, and other actions 
that affect the balance of supply and demand. In addition, various short lead time resources that can 
efficiently enter and exit on a year-by-year basis depending upon need (such as some imports, demand 
response, and resources that are economic on an energy-only basis) also tend to buffer the impact on 
price of entry in any year. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that in this example, the public poli-
cy capacity is fully anticipated and absorbed by market participants’ adjustments, and has minimal, if 
any, impact on capacity prices. While the entry of the public policy resources will likely correspond to 
some delay of other new entry, acceleration of retirements, or adjustments by resources able to enter 
and exit on a year-by-year basis, this displacement is of course what the public policy was intended to 
accomplish.”). 
 168. FERC may not approve tariff provisions that cover non-jurisdictional activity, including 
market mechanisms that fall outside FERC’s jurisdiction. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. 
Comm’n, 334 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (overturning FERC’s approval of a tariff allowing unbundled 
retail customers to take distribution service under the tariff because FERC did not have jurisdiction 
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While states have the authority to act on their policy preferences, FERC and 
ISOs retain a duty to determine whether market power abuse or other forms of 
manipulation are a concern. State public policy preferences should be carefully 
analyzed with this concern in mind. This is a difficult exercise to undertake, but 
law and policy demands nothing less.169 State actions and policies are different 
from the type of buyer-side market power abuses the MOPR was initially crafted 
to address.170 However, manipulative intent, and thus improper state action, may 
still be found where the target of the public policy preference is specifically within 
FERC’s authority.171 The narrow holding in Hughes, that state policies may not 
simply “disregard an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC,” serves as the 
relevant limiting principle.172 If the aim of the state’s policy preference is outside 
that specific FERC authority, FERC and the ISOs should give effect to those 
preferences to the greatest extent possible.173 
 
over unbundled retail distribution service). See also Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrat-
ing Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L. J. 1, 5 (2017). 
 169. See John Moore, Sustainable FERC Project, Statement on 2013 Technical Conference 
(Sept. 9, 2013), at 8-9, https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20130911144750-Moore%20Comments.pdf 
(“Application of a [MOPR] to state-incented clean energy resources unfairly reduces their capacity val-
ue and costs consumers money. The primary purpose of a MOPR is to prevent buyers of capacity from 
suppressing capacity prices by subsidizing higher-cost new capacity to replace lower cost existing capaci-
ty . . . . Many of these wind and solar resources are built to meet RPS standards; these resources will be 
constructed and will provide capacity benefits whether or not they are able to clear and take on a capaci-
ty supply obligation. The RTO also will be required to purchase through the annual capacity market 
auction additional, unnecessary resources. These purchases will impose unnecessary costs on consumers 
and produce unjust and unreasonable rates.”). 
 170. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 143 FERC ¶ 61,090, at P 20 (2013) (“PJM’s MOPR is a 
mechanism that seeks to prevent the exercise of buyer-side market power in the forward capacity mar-
ket, which occurs when a large net-buyer—that is, an entity that buys more capacity from the market 
than it sells into the market—invests in capacity and then offers that capacity into the auction at a re-
duced price. Given the uniform clearing prices in PJM’s markets, such behavior would benefit the net-
buyer so long as the reduction in the net-buyer’s purchasing costs exceeds its losses from selling the 
underpriced capacity.”). 
 171. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016). 
 172. Id. The Supreme Court recently affirmed the narrowness of its holding by denying certiora-
ri in two cases in which the petitioners sought to expand Hughes, arguing that Zero Emissions Credit 
(ZEC) policies, designed to compensate a non-energy value of generation (the carbon free attribute of 
the resource) and which did not condition compensation on clearing in a wholesale market, were mate-
rially similar to the Maryland program in effect, and therefore intruded on FERC’s authority. Coal. for 
Competitive Energy v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (Apr. 15, 
2019); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 
(2019) (Apr. 15, 2019). 
 173. Wilson Comments, supra note 25, at 7 (“[The] intentions, and the objectives a state may be 
pursuing, matter. A MOPR policy that is blind to such differences is likely to have false positives and 
false negatives for mitigation that will lead to litigation that FERC should ultimately lose.”); see 
SIMEONE, supra note 76, at 2 (“[S]tates have the right and the ability to enact legally acceptable policy 
that impacts electricity markets.”). 
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B.  ISOs Are Ill-Equipped to Act as Policymaking Entities 
One way for FERC to ensure that proper effect is given to state public poli-
cies is to ensure that ISOs do not stray into the policymaking realm themselves 
when market rules are changed. An ISO is not the proper venue to pursue public 
policy changes.174 As quasi-governmental entities, there is little political accounta-
bility for these organizations and no mandate to reflect the will and welfare of 
those the ISO serves.175 If an ISO were to pursue a disfavored policy preference, 
the public would have limited ability to shape the policy or to prevent it from go-
ing into effect.176 ISOs are not policymaking entities under state or federal law; they 
should not pursue rule changes that are fundamentally policy preferences (Subprinciple 5B). 
State legislatures, on the other hand, are accountable to their electorate, and there-
fore are the proper forum for policy changes that impact the electricity markets. 
FERC and the ISOs must ask whether a proposed rule change is in fact just a 
means to a preferred policy end for stakeholders or the ISO itself, possibly in reac-
tion to and at the expense of a legitimate state public policy. Whereas ISO market 
actions in pursuit of just and reasonable rates can work well with state actions in 
pursuit of policy objectives, two separate sets of broad policy actions may be diffi-
cult to synchronize. Proposed market rule changes at the ISO level should thus be 
focused on improving outcomes related to reliability at just and reasonable rates 
through non-unduly discriminatory and preferential means. Generally, this would 
suggest that ISO actions should focus upon the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the wholesale electricity market and should not favor the policy preferences of any 
particular stakeholder. 
 
 174. See MARK JAMES ET AL., HOW THE RTO STAKEHOLDER PROCESS AFFECTS MARKET 
EFFICIENCY 17 (2017), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/112.pdf (“Encouraging 
FERC to treat RTOs as institutions that are capable of self-interest may create a better environment to 
analyze the effects of market-rule design proposals. Furthermore, it could shift the weight and defer-
ence given to RTO proposals to those advanced by stakeholders and the market monitor. In this way, a 
well-informed group of market participants who have a well-defined role in governance can act as an 
appropriate check on the principal-agent problem”). 
 175. Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest 
in the Governance Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L. J. 543, 548 (2007) 
(“Neither the states nor the federal government have demonstrated the ability to hold these organiza-
tions accountable to the public. Even though RTOs have corporate boards, structural issues make it 
hard for those boards, alone, to protect the public interest.”). See, e.g., id. at 578-87; SIMEONE, supra 
note 76 at 25-26. 
 176. See Kenneth Rose, Trouble in Market Paradise: Development of the Regional Transmission Opera-
tor, 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 535, 536 (2016) (“These RTOs did not evolve by design or from government 
fiat. Rather, they have developed and grown over time, taking on an increasing responsibility and im-
portance. The result has been institutions that were not prescribed by legislation or regulation, but now 
exert a powerful influence with little public input. These RTOs are overseen by the [FERC], and they 
are governed by ‘independent’ boards and committees of ‘stakeholders’ that include market participants 
with strong economic interest in RTO rules and procedures. However, public input is peripheral, at 
best.”). 
_JCI_PANFI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020  4:12 PM 
Fall 2019] Electricity Market Principles 183 
 
FERC should ensure that any of its own actions or decisions, and any market 
design changes or other actions recommended by the ISOs it regulates, do not vio-
late either of the tenets propounded in subprinciple 5A and 5B. Abiding by these 
cooperative federalism principles will ensure continued success for competitive 
electricity markets and the efficient electricity those markets bring to ratepayers. 177 
Decisions contrary to these tenets can undermine competition and economic effi-
ciency in the electricity markets. As discussed in Market Principle 2, all resources’ 
contributions to resource adequacy should be recognized. Attempts by ISOs to 
mute states’ policy preferences, which could effectively prevent certain state-
supported resources from fully participating in the market, introduce inefficiencies 
and contain the risk of making the consumers pay twice for the same energy ser-
vice.178 Rather, “harmonizing state goals and the operation of wholesale electricity 
markets could leverage market forces to more efficiently meet both state goals and 
traditional electric system goals of providing affordable, reliable supply.”179 
C.  Courts Have Consistently Upheld State Policymaking Authority 
Courts have consistently upheld states’ authority to craft public policy in fur-
therance of their citizens’ interest.180 FERC likewise has generally recognized this 
state authority.181 Tension persists, however, in instances where state policy deci-
sions and wholesale markets intersect.182 With respect to wholesale markets, FERC 
has stated that: 
 
 177. See SIMEONE, supra note 76, at 2 (“Failure to effectively incorporate and manage state-based 
political values with market design may lead to compromises that threaten the legitimacy of the 
RTO/ISO organization and its markets.”). 
 178. ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 5 (2018) (recognizing the concern that 
MOPR application to state subsidized resources “may cause consumers to ‘pay twice’ for the same ca-
pacity—i.e., pay once for capacity procured in the FCM to serve their demand, and pay a second time 
for the additional capacity obtained through out-of-market contracts with state-supported resources.”). 
 179. SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., PRICING CARBON INTO NYISO’S WHOLESALE ENERGY 
MARKET TO SUPPORT NEW YORK’S DECARBONIZATION GOALS 9 (2017), https://www.nyiso.com/
documents/20142/2244202/2017-Pricing_Carbon_into_NYISOs_Wholesale_Energy_Market-Brattle-
Report.pdf/ec266c79-d819-9466-77c8-66c6db8e3b53. 
 180. See, e.g., Coal. for Competitive Energy v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018) (upholding 
New York’s ZEC Program), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 
F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding Illinois’ ZEC Program), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Allco 
Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (upholding Connecticut’s renewable energy solicitations 
and Renewable Portfolio Standard). 
 181. See, e.g., WSPP, Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2012). 
 182. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) 
(finding that FERC’s demand response rules do not interfere with state regulatory authority over retail 
sales); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). (holding that Maryland’s actions inter-
fered with FERC’s authority over wholesale energy markets); Zibelman, 906 F.3d at 46 (concluding that 
NY’s ZEC program does not interfere with FERC’s authority over wholesale market); Star, 904 F.3d at 
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The Commission acknowledges the rights of states to pursue policy inter-
ests within their jurisdiction. Our concern, however, is where pursuit of 
these policy interests allows uneconomic entry of [out-of-market (OOM)] 
capacity into the capacity market that is subject to our jurisdiction, with 
the effect of suppressing capacity prices in those markets. We note that 
our primary concern stems not from the state policies themselves, but 
from the accompanying price constructs that result in offers into the ca-
pacity market from these resources that are not reflective of their actual 
costs. We agree with arguments contending that OOM capacity sup-
presses prices regardless of intent and that the Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction on assessing whether wholesale rates are just and reasonable. 
In fact, the Commission has previously found that uneconomic entry can 
produce unjust and unreasonable prices by artificially depressing capacity 
prices, and therefore, the deterrence of uneconomic entry falls within the 
Commission’s jurisdiction. It is these unjust and unreasonable outcomes 
in a Commission-jurisdiction market that is the focus of our actions 
here.183 
The Commission thus recognizes dual aims: it must both ensure that whole-
sale markets achieve just and reasonable outcomes, and also not intrude upon state 
jurisdiction. Decisions and designs not able to achieve both aims should be disfa-
vored. While neither sphere of jurisdiction is “hermetically sealed” from the other, 
this does not provide license for market mechanisms to undermine state public pol-
icy. Whether current mechanisms respect this balance should be a key considera-
tion for FERC, consistent with foundational market principles.184 
CONCLUSION 
FERC has encouraged wholesale electricity markets, and has done so with 
vigorous emphasis on market-based solutions. The five market principles identified 
here are those the Commission has implicitly relied upon as those markets have 
developed. These market principles are supported by policy and legal foundations 
that run through a myriad of historic and current FERC orders and court deci-
sions. They are elemental to how FERC understands its own statutory authority, 
and thus regardless of Commission makeup, they should consistently pervade and 
guide decision-making to support durable competitive wholesale electricity mar-
kets. 
 
525 (explaining that Illinois’ ZEC program does not interfere with FERC’s authority over wholesale 
market). 
 183. ISO New England, Inc., 135 FERC 61,029, at P 170 (2011) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 184. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P 163 (2007) (providing an 
example of FERC consciously respecting the balance of power between itself and states); ISO New 
England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
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The Commission’s goal requires the protection of competition, not individual 
competitors.185 The Commission’s goal is to foster efficient, competitive markets 
because those are the markets that ensure just and reasonable and not unduly dis-
criminatory or preferential rates. In following these principles, FERC and ISOs 
can meet these goals and evaluate proposed market interventions and rule changes 
to ensure that solutions will create the best outcomes. When used in concert, these 
principles empower FERC to effectuate its statutory mandate and ensure lowest-
cost electricity for consumers. 
 
 185. ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at 4 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part 
and concurring in part). 
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APPENDIX 1: PRINCIPLES SUMMARY 
MARKET PRINCIPLE 1: WHOLESALE MARKET REVENUES SHOULD 
PREDOMINATELY FLOW FROM WELL-DESIGNED ENERGY AND 
ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKETS 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 1A: Market design changes that shift revenue from 
energy and ancillary services markets to capacity markets should be 
minimized. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 1B: Markets should focus compensation on delivered 
services over idle capacity. 
MARKET PRINCIPLE 2: WHEN ALTERING MARKET DESIGN, FERC AND 
ISOS SHOULD FOCUS ON ONLY THOSE SERVICES THAT ARE CLEARLY 
NEEDED AND ENSURE THAT ANY MARKET DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT 
UNDULY DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN RESOURCES 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 2A: Rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis 
that demonstrates how the intervention is responsive to the market 
design issue identified should accompany and underlie any proposal. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 2B: All resources that have the ability to provide an 
identified needed service should be allowed to compete to do so in 
order to minimize costs to consumers. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 2C: Proposed market design changes should explicitly 
identify the precise issue targeted by the proposed change and rigor-
ously analyze that issue to ensure that a more narrowly tailored ap-
proach is not capable of solving the specified issue. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 2D: Where a market rule change is likely to have a 
discriminatory or preferential impact, rigorous effort should be made 
to identify non-discriminatory alternative solutions. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 2E: Emerging technologies and business models 
should receive commensurate access to markets to enable a more 
economic and efficient marketplace for ratepayers. 
MARKET PRINCIPLE 3: MINIMIZE INTERVENTIONS THAT DISTORT 
TRANSPARENT AND ACCURATE PRICING 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 3A: Out-of-market intervention is generally disfa-
vored relative to in-market intervention. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 3B: When intervention is implemented, it should be 
narrowly tailored and rely upon market principles and mechanisms. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 3C: Interventions should be feasible to implement 
and not contain elements that rely on abstract concepts or arbitrary 
distinctions that hinder implementation. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 3D: Interventions should resolve the identified mar-
ket failure without creating symptomatic incentives or the need for 
future market interventions. 
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MARKET PRINCIPLE 4: THE JUST AND REASONABLE STANDARD 
STRONGLY FAVORS RATE DECREASING OUTCOMES 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 4A: An intervention or market rule that (a) increases 
costs, (b) decreases economic efficiency, (c) supports existing uneco-
nomic generation unneeded for reliability services, or (d) does not 
further a state public policy should be viewed with care. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 4B: Interventions and market rules that increase rates 
should be accompanied by rigorous evidence showing how ratepayers 
benefit from incurred higher costs. 
MARKET PRINCIPLE 5: FERC AND ISOS SHOULD FACILITATE AND NOT 
UNDERMINE STATE PUBLIC POLICY PREFERENCES 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 5A: Market design should ensure state public policy 
preferences are given full effect, but not allow manipulative behavior 
from any market participant. 
• SUBPRINCIPLE 5B: ISOs are not policymaking entities under state or 
federal law; they should not pursue rule changes that are fundamen-
tally policy preferences. 
 
